Houthis and Bab al-Mandeb: Risks in US-Iran Conflict

In the volatile landscape of the Middle East, where proxy conflicts intersect with great-power rivalries stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Horn of Africa, the escalation of US-Iran hostilities has thrust maritime chokepoints into the center of strategic calculations. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait now embodies these broader dynamics, as Tehran seeks to leverage its Yemeni allies to impose asymmetric costs on Washington and its partners. Any sustained disruption here risks cascading effects on global energy flows, European security postures, and the economic diversification plans of Gulf states already navigating sanctions and shifting alliances.

Houthis and Bab al-Mandeb: Tehran's Second Chokepoint Gamble

Beirut, Lebanon — July 18, 2026 — The Houthi movement in Yemen stands at a crossroads as the US-Iran war reshapes Middle Eastern security architecture. Reports indicate Iran has instructed Houthi forces to prepare closure of the Bab al-Mandeb if the United States strikes Iranian power infrastructure, raising the prospect of two simultaneous maritime chokepoint blockades that would sever critical global trade arteries.

Iran's Directive and Houthi Operational Limits

The Houthis already demonstrated capability during their Red Sea campaign that began in October 2023 in solidarity with Hamas and paused after the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in October 2025. That earlier effort produced a 50 percent drop in commercial traffic through the Red Sea. Riad Kahwaji emphasizes that without steady Iranian weapons and intelligence support, any renewed campaign risks rapid depletion of Houthi missile and drone stocks.

Iran's relationship with the Houthis began with limited advisory support in the mid-2000s but accelerated after the 2014-2015 takeover of Sanaa. Tehran shifted from ideological backing to direct provision of advanced weaponry once the Saudi-led coalition imposed a naval blockade. By 2017-2019, Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions and Quds-series cruise missiles appeared in Houthi inventories, followed by longer-range ballistic systems such as the Emad and Sejjil derivatives. These transfers occurred through overland routes via Iraq and Syria or by dhows crossing the Arabian Sea, though coalition interdictions reduced successful deliveries to an estimated 20-30 percent of attempted shipments.

Domestic constraints inside Yemen further cap Houthi escalation. The country faces acute food insecurity affecting over 21 million people, with the riyal losing more than 50 percent of its value since 2021 and fuel prices tripling in Houthi-controlled areas. Iranian directives therefore emphasize calibrated attacks that avoid triggering a full-scale coalition response capable of destroying remaining port infrastructure at Hudaydah. The result is a pattern of periodic, high-visibility strikes rather than sustained campaigns that would exhaust limited missile stocks.

This calibrated approach reflects Tehran's broader doctrine of plausible deniability, allowing Iran to project power through proxies while minimizing direct exposure. Yet the absence of reliable resupply lines transforms what was once a low-cost harassment campaign into a high-stakes gamble that could erode Houthi staying power within weeks.

EU Operation Aspides Expands Mandate

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas visited Djibouti and announced an expanded mandate for Operation Aspides to include minesweeping. She stated, "If one vital trade route is closed, then we need the other one to be clearly open." The mission has already safeguarded more than 670 merchant ships since February 2024. Operation Commander Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis noted the force struggles to match shipping industry demand. General Sean Clancy, Chair of the EU Military Committee, described the deployment as "the European Union expressing its strategic interest" in keeping both the Red Sea and alternative routes secure.

The expansion of Aspides signals Europe's determination to safeguard its economic lifelines independently of US-led initiatives, even as transatlantic coordination remains essential for intelligence sharing and logistics. This defensive posture, however, leaves open questions about whether European navies possess sufficient tonnage to deter a determined proxy campaign backed by Iranian technical expertise.

Simultaneous Pressure on Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb

Iran's existing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz compounds the risk. Two critical chokepoints now face potential disruption at once. Roughly 21 million barrels of oil and 4.5 trillion cubic feet of LNG transit the Strait of Hormuz daily, while Bab al-Mandeb handles approximately 4.8 million barrels of crude and refined products plus significant container traffic linking Asia to Europe. The 2023-2024 Houthi campaign demonstrated the strait's vulnerability: more than 150 attacks on commercial vessels forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10-14 days to voyages and increasing insurance war-risk premiums from 0.1 percent to over 1 percent of hull value.

Under UNCLOS, the right of transit passage through these straits remains legally protected, yet enforcement depends on naval presence rather than treaty mechanisms. China's exposure is acute; its Belt and Road investments include the Doraleh port in Djibouti and stakes in Haifa, making any prolonged closure of the Red Sea corridor a direct threat to energy security and project timelines. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and UAE diversification plans, both predicated on stable maritime exports and tourism infrastructure along the Red Sea coast, face similar downside risks from sustained disruption.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta has recorded a surge in Indian Ocean piracy linked to the Hormuz blockade. TankerMap data shows Bab al-Mandeb still handling six to nine daily transits as of mid-July, underscoring its continued importance for 10-15 percent of global maritime trade, including significant European oil and gas imports.

The dual-chokepoint scenario would force global shipping into prolonged detours, amplifying inflationary pressures on commodities and exposing the fragility of just-in-time supply chains that have defined post-pandemic recovery efforts.

Gulf States' Leverage and Second-Order Effects

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi possess diplomatic and financial tools to influence Houthi behavior indirectly through Oman and through quiet channels with Tehran. Yet any Houthi escalation would also threaten Saudi and Emirati diversification plans that rely on stable Red Sea access. Saudi Arabia had developed workarounds routing energy exports through Red Sea ports to bypass Hormuz; closure of Bab al-Mandeb would eliminate those alternatives. Energy markets would face renewed volatility, while global shipping costs would climb sharply. The Houthis' recent missile fire toward Saudi territory signals rising internal pressure within the movement to demonstrate relevance amid the wider US-Iran confrontation.

Gulf equity markets reacted sharply to each major Houthi escalation, with the Tadawul and DFM indices declining 3-5 percent on days of intensified attacks, prompting sovereign wealth funds to increase holdings in defense and energy logistics equities.

Strategic Calculus for All Parties

Tehran seeks to raise costs for Washington without triggering direct regime-threatening retaliation. The Houthis must weigh short-term political gains against the possibility of losing their northern Yemeni strongholds, including the Red Sea port of Hudaydah. European powers aim to protect trade flows without becoming entangled in the US-Iran military contest.

Israel views Bab al-Mandeb as critical for Eilat port access and alternative supply lines that bypass the Mediterranean. Egypt's Suez Canal generated $9.5 billion in revenue during FY 2023/24; a 40 percent drop in transits since late 2023 has already forced Cairo to seek additional IMF support. U.S. CENTCOM maintains carrier strike groups in the region supported by bases in Bahrain and Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, enabling rapid interception but requiring continuous high-tempo operations. Russia benefits from elevated global energy prices that offset sanctions pressure while exploring limited naval coordination with Iran through joint exercises in the Gulf of Oman; however, Moscow has avoided direct entanglement that could jeopardize its own grain and arms export routes.

European Response and Global Trade Implications

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas's visit to Djibouti produced a Status of Forces Agreement that formalizes European naval access and intelligence sharing, complementing existing French and German facilities. Operation Aspides focuses on defensive escort and vessel protection with a narrower mandate than the counter-piracy Operation Atalanta, reflecting European reluctance to engage Houthi land targets directly.

European economies remain heavily exposed: roughly 15 percent of EU petroleum imports and 12 percent of LNG cargoes historically route through the Red Sea. War-risk insurance premiums have risen from $1,000-$2,000 per transit to $150,000-$200,000, prompting Maersk and MSC to divert vessels. Djibouti's unique hosting of U.S., French, Chinese, Japanese, Italian, and German bases gives it leverage as a logistics hub, yet the Cape of Good Hope alternative adds 14-21 days and roughly $1 million in extra fuel and charter costs per large container voyage, eroding margins across global supply chains.

Regional Implications

If the Houthis proceed without assured Iranian support, the result could be rapid degradation of their capabilities and a temporary reopening of the strait under heavier international naval presence. However, a coordinated Iranian-Houthi campaign to close both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb simultaneously would represent an unprecedented disruption to global energy markets, potentially pushing crude above $150 per barrel and triggering recessionary pressures across Europe and Asia. The coming weeks will test whether deterrence or escalation prevails at these narrow but vital waterways that underpin the global economy.

By Malik Hassan, Staff Writer