Blue Homeland Bill Fuels Turkey-Greece Maritime Tensions

The Draft Legislation and Its Limited Scope

The Blue Homeland doctrine, which took shape over the 2010s, covers Türkiye's maritime zones across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. It gained prominence after the 2020 EEZ delimitation agreement with Libya and remains a major source of tension with Greece over unresolved maritime boundary issues. Despite this doctrine, Türkiye has enacted only the 1982 Territorial Waters Act as the fundamental framework for its maritime zones under domestic law. The draft bill presented by Ankara University's National Centre for the Sea and Maritime Law maintains the traditional Turkish approach that territorial waters in the Aegean should be six nautical miles, according to Yücel Acer of the Presidential Council on Legal Policies. The measure would establish the domestic legal basis for arguments Türkiye has advanced for years, yet it preserves the existing six-nautical-mile limit rather than expanding claims.

Historical Shift in Greek Strategy Since 1996

This impasse arose when Kostas Simitis came to power in Greece in 1996 and abandoned the policy of keeping Türkiye out of the EU, recasting bilateral issues as a Türkiye-EU problem. The shift aimed to offset the power asymmetry with Türkiye while assuming the EU's soft power would help resolve disputes peacefully. That assumption held briefly, but the EU's influence has instead entrenched the status quo and perpetuated the problems. Greece's strategy of internationalizing the dispute now rests on a legal foundation that Türkiye does not accept, as Ankara is not a party to UNCLOS.

Greek Political Reactions and Electoral Pressures

The DEHUKAM presentation drew significant reactions from both the government and opposition in Greece, amplified by the Greek press and looming elections. Members of the government characterized the move as a unilateral and revisionist act contrary to UNCLOS. Opposition parties proposed a 12-nautical-mile extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean, which Türkiye deemed a casus belli in 1995, and the suspension of all EU programs relating to Türkiye. The main Greek objection centers on the provision granting the Turkish president authority to designate maritime areas with special status in zones where an EEZ has not yet been declared, though this authority applies only where no delimitation treaty exists.

Legal Vacuum and Parallel Unilateral Actions

In a sea where no delimitation treaty binds the parties, both states are filling the legal vacuum using means of their own choosing. While Türkiye pursues domestic codification, Greece has floated unilateral options such as a marine park in the Eastern Aegean during the same period. The issue is not that one side is revisionist while the other defends the status quo; rather, in the absence of a treaty-based framework, both seek to consolidate their positions through unilateral moves. The draft bill even surfaced in the European Parliament's 2025 report on Türkiye, adopted on June 17, 2026, which called on Türkiye to respect the sovereignty of all EU member states over their territorial waters.

EU Support as Structural Obstacle to Compromise

At the root of the disputes lie either differing interpretations of an existing treaty or matters that require the parties to reach a bilateral agreement. The demilitarization of the Aegean islands turns on conflicting readings of the 1923 Lausanne and 1947 Paris treaties, while EEZ delimitation requires a bilateral agreement that does not yet exist. Resolving such issues requires mutual concessions, not maximalism. Yet the EU's almost unconditional support for the Greek position is one of the greatest obstacles to Greece abandoning its maximalist stance toward Türkiye, a candidate country. Greece resisted announcing its maritime spatial plan in the Aegean, which conflicts with Türkiye's claims, for years until the Court of Justice's 2025 ruling compelled it to do so, triggering a new crisis.

Strategic Calculus and Regional Implications

Both UNCLOS and customary international law point first and foremost to a bilateral agreement as the mechanism for resolving such disputes. Türkiye's approach emphasizes direct negotiation on maritime boundaries, while Greece's reliance on instruments it alone has signed creates an asymmetry that blocks progress. The resulting stalemate affects energy exploration timelines in the Eastern Mediterranean, influences NATO coordination in the Aegean, and shapes Türkiye's broader foreign policy options toward diversification of partnerships. Without movement toward a negotiated framework, the cycle of draft legislation, political reactions, and external amplification is likely to repeat, sustaining uncertainty for all actors with interests in the region's maritime routes and resources.

By Malik Hassan, Staff Writer