Xi Jinping Welcomes Kazakh President Tokayev to WAIC 2026 as China Elevates AI Governance to Top of National Agenda

Xi Jinping Welcomes Kazakh President Tokayev to WAIC 2026 as China Elevates AI Governance to Top of National Agenda

The Bilateral Meeting in Shanghai

President Xi Jinping met Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Shanghai on July 16, 2026. Discussions centered on expanding cooperation in artificial intelligence, green energy projects, e-commerce platforms, digital finance mechanisms, and the Digital Silk Road initiative. Both leaders reviewed progress on existing joint projects and identified new areas for collaboration that align with their respective national development priorities.

Xi's Historic Keynote at WAIC 2026

This marks the first occasion since the World Artificial Intelligence Conference began in 2018 that President Xi has personally attended and delivered a keynote address at the opening ceremony on July 17. The speech is expected to present China's comprehensive vision for global AI governance, emphasizing equitable access to technology and multilateral coordination mechanisms.

The decision by Xi Jinping to deliver a full keynote at WAIC 2026, rather than a video address or delegation led by a vice premier as in prior editions, marks a deliberate elevation of artificial intelligence within China’s national strategy. MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian’s preview that Xi would “systemically elaborate on China’s proposals” signals an intent to present a cohesive framework linking AI development to the 14th Five-Year Plan’s emphasis on technological self-reliance and digital infrastructure. This shift from previous years underscores how AI has moved from sectoral experimentation to a core pillar of state planning, with ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Cyberspace Administration of China now coordinating implementation across provinces.

Historically, WAIC has served as a platform for incremental policy signals rather than head-of-state pronouncements. The 2026 format therefore communicates that Beijing views AI governance and capability-building as instruments of great-power competition on par with trade or security dialogues. By placing the address at the center of the agenda, China positions itself to shape multilateral expectations before Western regulatory models consolidate further, while simultaneously reassuring domestic technology firms and research institutes that central-level support remains firm through the plan period and beyond.

China's Proposal for WAICO

Beijing is advancing the creation of the World AI Cooperation Organization, known as WAICO, as a platform oriented toward the Global South. This body would serve as an alternative to frameworks led by Western nations, focusing on capacity building, technology transfer, and policy coordination among developing countries. The proposal reflects China's interest in shaping international norms in emerging technologies.

China’s proposed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) is designed to offer an alternative to the OECD AI Principles, the EU AI Act’s risk-based classification, and the Global Partnership on AI’s emphasis on democratic values and export controls. Where those frameworks prioritize regulatory harmonization among advanced economies, WAICO is framed around technology transfer, joint capacity building, and lighter compliance burdens suited to developing economies. This distinction appeals directly to Global South partners seeking to avoid the high implementation costs associated with European-style conformity assessments or U.S. entity-list restrictions.

Potential founding members are expected to include Belt and Road Initiative participants, Shanghai Cooperation Organization states, and ASEAN economies already engaged in digital infrastructure projects with Chinese firms. By anchoring the organization in existing multilateral networks, Beijing can accelerate standard-setting in areas such as data localization and algorithmic auditing that favor Chinese technical architectures. Over time, this risks creating parallel certification regimes that complicate supply chains for companies operating across both Western and Chinese-led systems, intensifying the bifurcation of global AI governance.

Strategically, WAICO functions as a counterweight in U.S.-China technology competition by converting infrastructure financing into normative influence. Countries that adopt its guidelines may gain preferential access to Chinese models, cloud services, and talent programs, gradually eroding the reach of OECD and GPAI initiatives in regions where regulatory capacity remains limited.

Kazakhstan's Strategic Position in the Belt and Road

Kazakhstan holds particular importance as the location where President Xi first proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in Astana in 2013. The country continues to function as a key transit hub linking China with Central Asia and Europe. Tokayev's participation in WAIC 2026 underscores ongoing efforts to integrate digital infrastructure with the original BRI vision.

Kazakhstan’s role as host to the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in Astana gives Tokayev’s presence at WAIC 2026 added symbolic weight. The Digital Silk Road component of that initiative has already produced concrete projects, including data centers and 5G pilot zones developed with Chinese partners, positioning Kazakhstan as an early test bed for cross-border AI applications in logistics and resource management. These investments complement the country’s longstanding function as a transit hub on the China-Europe railway and the emerging Middle Corridor, where AI-enabled customs and predictive maintenance systems can reduce transit times and enhance reliability.

Energy cooperation further deepens the relationship. Traditional oil and gas pipelines are now supplemented by joint ventures in green hydrogen and renewable integration, areas where AI optimization of grids and storage is becoming central. Kazakhstan therefore serves as both a physical and digital bridge, allowing China to demonstrate how WAICO-style cooperation can deliver tangible infrastructure gains without the regulatory overhead of Western frameworks.

Looking forward, Astana’s balancing act between Chinese technology partnerships and its multi-vector foreign policy will test whether WAICO can accommodate participants who also maintain ties with the EU and United States. Success here could validate the organization’s claim to inclusivity; friction could expose limits in reconciling differing data-governance expectations.

The Significance of Xi's Personal Attendance

President Xi's decision to attend WAIC 2026 in person signals that artificial intelligence has risen to the highest level of China's national leadership agenda. This move elevates the conference from a technical forum to a platform for strategic policy announcements, demonstrating Beijing's intent to lead in both technological development and governance discussions.

Strengthening China-Kazakhstan Ties through SCO

Both nations are permanent members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which provides an established institutional framework for security and economic cooperation. Their partnership facilitates joint initiatives in digital connectivity and technology standards, reinforcing regional stability while advancing shared interests in multilateral institutions.

AI Ambitions within Dual Circulation Strategy

China's Dual Circulation strategy prioritizes technological self-sufficiency in critical sectors including AI hardware and software. Domestic innovation is paired with selective international partnerships to reduce reliance on external supply chains. Cooperation with Kazakhstan supports this approach by creating testing grounds for Chinese AI applications in energy, logistics, and finance.

What This Means for Global AI Governance

The convergence of the Xi-Tokayev meeting with the WAIC platform illustrates China's strategic calculus: leveraging bilateral ties with BRI partners to build support for alternative governance structures. Kazakhstan gains access to advanced technologies and investment, while China secures a diplomatic foothold in Central Asia. Second-order effects include heightened competition with Western-led initiatives, potential fragmentation of global AI standards, and increased influence for Global South voices in technology policy. ASEAN and EU stakeholders will need to navigate these parallel frameworks as they develop their own regulatory approaches. The emphasis on WAICO suggests Beijing aims to institutionalize its preferences before Western models achieve broader adoption.

The simultaneous promotion of WAICO alongside established Western initiatives increases the likelihood of fragmented global AI standards. Rather than converging on a single set of rules, regulators and firms may face competing certification requirements, model audit protocols, and data-sharing obligations. The EU’s emphasis on fundamental rights, the U.S. focus on security-driven export controls, and China’s stress on sovereign development capacity are already pulling standards in different directions, with middle powers forced to navigate overlapping or contradictory expectations.

ASEAN, the African Union, and Latin American nations will confront immediate choices about which frameworks to reference in national legislation and procurement policies. Short-term incentives favor pragmatic adoption of multiple systems to secure investment from all major powers. Over the longer term, however, path dependence may lock regions into one governance cluster, affecting everything from talent mobility to the interoperability of critical digital infrastructure.

Scenarios range from managed coexistence, in which technical working groups bridge select standards, to sharper bifurcation that raises costs for global AI deployment. The outcome will hinge on whether WAICO can demonstrate concrete benefits in capacity building faster than Western frameworks can adapt their regulatory models to developing-country contexts.

By Prof. Marcus Chen, Staff Writer