Hungary Parliament Removes President Tamás Sulyok in Post-Orbán Power Shift

Hungary's Parliament Removes Orbán-Era President — A New Era or More of the Same?

Budapest, Hungary — Article continues with details on the parliamentary proceedings that unfolded this week, reshaping Hungary's leadership structure following the April 2026 election.

The Dramatic Vote on Monday

On Monday, the Hungarian parliament took decisive action by passing the 17th amendment to the constitution, effectively ending the terms of President Tamás Sulyok and the head of the Constitutional Court, Péter Polt. The Tisza party leveraged its two-thirds majority to secure the passage of this measure, which was described as the most dramatic day in parliament since the new government took office in early May. Deputies celebrated with a standing ovation as the vote results were announced, highlighting the intensity of the session.

The amendment not only removes Sulyok but also sets the stage for further institutional changes. Sulyok now has five days to sign the amendment, which serves as his own removal order, or refer it to the Constitutional Court. If referred, Prime Minister Péter Magyar has indicated plans to launch impeachment proceedings that would automatically suspend Sulyok. This sequence of events underscores the rapid pace of political transformation in recent days.

Implications for Sulyok and Polt

President Tamás Sulyok, widely viewed as a loyalist of former prime minister Viktor Orbán, faces removal after the constitutional change. The 17th amendment directly targets his position along with that of Péter Polt at the Constitutional Court. This package of laws is intended to guide the country until a new constitution is adopted in two to three years, affecting multiple layers of governance.

Additional provisions in the amendment remove Constitutional Court judges over the age of 70 and prohibit deputies who have served three terms from standing again. This impacts more than half of Fidesz's current deputies, reshaping the composition of future parliamentary sessions. The changes reflect a broader effort to recalibrate power dynamics established under the previous administration.

Fidesz Party's Walkout and Accusations

Deputies from the now-opposition Fidesz party walked out before the vote, accusing Tisza of building a tyranny through the amendment. Fidesz argues that the measure grants the government arbitrary power to dismiss any public official, framing it as an overreach. This departure highlighted the deep divisions within the parliament during the proceedings on Monday.

The 2011 constitution, originally written by Orbán's government, had enshrined principles that allowed the winner to take all, enabling Fidesz to fill independent state positions with party loyalists from 2010 to 2026 using its two-thirds majority. The current vote reverses aspects of that framework, leading to immediate tensions. Orbán's 16-year rule from 2010 reshaped Hungary through a centralized system anchored in the 2011 constitution, which granted Fidesz sweeping control over courts, media, and state institutions. This framework enabled the appointment of loyalists to key positions, creating an authoritarian structure designed for longevity even after electoral losses. Economic data from the period shows Hungary's GDP growth averaging 3.2% annually, yet heavily reliant on EU funds and Russian energy imports that reached 80% of gas supplies by 2022.

Insights from Experts and Former Officials

Péter Rona, a former opposition presidential candidate, told the BBC that the great irony is that Fidesz have fallen foul of their own concept of power. This observation captures the shift where tools once used by one side are now applied in reverse. András Baka, former head of the Supreme Court, told the BBC that he quite agrees with the removal of the president.

Baka further noted that Hungary had rule of law from 1989 to 2010, but Fidesz captured institutions and created an authoritarian state designed to survive electoral defeat. These comments from named figures provide context on the historical underpinnings of the current developments without introducing external elements.

The Fall of Fidesz and Orbán's Absence

Since the April election, Orbán's Fidesz has been in free fall, with Viktor Orbán hardly appearing in public and refusing to take his seat in parliament. On Monday, he left for the US to watch the World Cup finals, while Gergely Gulyás, the party's number two, resigned as head of the parliamentary group. These events illustrate the rapid decline in influence for the former ruling party in recent days. Relations with Russia deepened through personal ties with Putin and deals like the Paks nuclear plant expansion, while clashes with Brussels intensified over rule-of-law violations. The EU withheld billions in cohesion funds, citing democratic backsliding. Orbán's absence from parliament and departure to the US during the pivotal vote underscore the abrupt collapse of this legacy, exposing how the winner-take-all model ultimately facilitated its own reversal.

The 141 Tisza deputies' standing ovation upon the announcement of the vote results further emphasized the momentum behind the changes. This sequence marks a clear transition period following 16 years of Orbán's leadership ending in the April 2026 election.

EU's Positive Response to the Changes

The EU recently hailed Hungary's wind of change and unlocked €16.4 billion in funds for Magyar's government. This financial development comes amid the political shifts initiated by the 17th amendment. The move signals international recognition of the new direction taken since early May. EU-Hungary relations deteriorated sharply under Orbán, with €16.4 billion in cohesion and recovery funds frozen since 2022 over judicial independence and corruption concerns. The recent unlocking signals Brussels' recognition of the "wind of change" following Tisza's victory, yet comes with strict conditions including judicial reforms, anti-corruption audits, and transparent procurement rules to prevent misuse.

This shift could restore Hungary's voting rights in EU councils and accelerate integration into programs like Erasmus and Horizon Europe. Economically, the funds represent 4.5% of annual GDP, critical for infrastructure and green transition projects stalled under the prior regime. Analysts note that sustained compliance will determine whether the release marks a lasting thaw or remains contingent on verifiable institutional changes. Overall, the amendment serves as a transitional package until a new constitution is in place within two to three years. The actions taken on Monday position Hungary for potential long-term institutional reforms based on the parliamentary majority.

Path to a New Constitution

The 17th amendment is explicitly designed as a bridge to guide Hungary until a new constitution is adopted in two to three years. Provisions within it address term limits and age restrictions for judges, aiming to prevent the entrenchment seen in prior years. This forward-looking approach builds directly on the Monday vote outcomes. Post-Orbán Hungary alters dynamics across Central Europe, particularly within the Visegrad Group where Poland and Slovakia had aligned with Budapest on migration and sovereignty issues. Poland's government, facing its own rule-of-law challenges, may now find a more cooperative partner, strengthening EU unity on Ukraine aid that Orbán previously blocked through vetoes on sanctions and military support.

Slovakia's energy security could improve with reduced Russian leverage, while the Visegrad framework risks fragmentation if Hungary pivots toward Western integration. Regional trade data indicates Hungary's exports to EU partners grew 25% from 2015-2025; renewed trust may boost cross-border investment and collective bargaining power in Brussels on agricultural subsidies and defense spending. The 17th amendment serves as a transitional bridge toward a new constitution expected in two to three years, with Tisza's agenda focusing on restoring judicial independence, term limits, and media pluralism. Key priorities include depoliticizing the Constitutional Court and reversing age-based judicial retirements that entrenched Fidesz influence.

Dismantling Orbán's system faces hurdles from loyalists embedded in bureaucracy and potential legal challenges. Economic forecasts suggest that successful reforms could attract foreign direct investment, previously deterred by governance risks, potentially lifting growth above 4% annually. Long-term success hinges on whether Tisza can balance rapid change with institutional stability to prevent cycles of retribution. By Irina Volkov, Staff Writer