ASEAN Chief Sets Year-End Target for South China Sea Code of Conduct

ASEAN Secretary-General's Latest Timeline for COC Conclusion

The ASEAN Secretary-General's projection that the Code of Conduct negotiations should conclude within this year reflects a measured optimism grounded in recent rounds of talks under the ASEAN-China framework. This timeline aligns with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which has guided discussions for over two decades. Progress has been incremental, with working groups addressing textual refinements, yet the Secretary-General stressed the need for sustained political will to bridge remaining gaps. Such a target, if met, would mark a significant milestone in regional diplomacy, though historical patterns suggest that enforcement mechanisms and verification processes often extend beyond initial deadlines. The cautious phrasing employed by the Secretary-General underscores that this is an aspirational goal rather than a guaranteed outcome, consistent with ASEAN's consensus-driven approach that avoids rigid ultimatums.

Diplomatic momentum has built through high-level meetings, including those involving the ASEAN Secretariat and Chinese counterparts, where drafts have been iteratively revised. The Secretary-General highlighted that external pressures, including unilateral actions by claimants, could derail this schedule, urging all parties to prioritize dialogue. This timeline also ties into ASEAN's broader institutional reforms aimed at enhancing its role in conflict prevention. By setting a year-end benchmark, the Secretary-General positions the organization to demonstrate relevance amid great-power rivalries, though success hinges on aligning divergent national interests without compromising the principle of non-interference.

China's Position on the South China Sea COC and Its Strategic Interests

China's stance on the Code of Conduct, articulated through the Chinese Foreign Ministry and senior officials such as Wang Yi, centers on achieving a framework that respects historical claims while advancing mutual development. Beijing views the COC as a tool to stabilize the region and prevent external interference, aligning with its Dual Circulation strategy that emphasizes technological self-sufficiency and secure maritime routes. The MFA spokesperson has repeatedly noted that the agreement should be binding yet flexible, excluding provisions that could constrain China's legitimate rights in waters it regards as within its jurisdiction. This position supports China's objective of expanding regional influence through infrastructure initiatives and economic partnerships, particularly with ASEAN members seeking investment under the Belt and Road framework.

Strategically, China seeks to leverage the COC to reinforce ASEAN centrality while mitigating risks from U.S. naval presence. Wang Yi's engagements have stressed that the code must emerge from direct ASEAN-China consultations, free from third-party impositions. This approach reflects Beijing's foreign policy doctrine of peaceful development, where control over key sea lanes bolsters energy security and trade flows. Second-order effects include strengthened ties with Global South nations wary of Western-led alliances, potentially reshaping multilateral institutions in Asia. However, China's insistence on bilateral dispute resolution within the COC framework could limit ASEAN's collective leverage, illustrating the tension between national sovereignty assertions and regional integration goals.

The Remaining Sticking Points in Negotiations

Negotiations on the Code of Conduct continue to grapple with core issues such as fishing rights, resource exploration, military activities, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Fishing rights remain contentious because overlapping exclusive economic zones affect traditional livelihoods across claimant states, requiring provisions that balance conservation with access rights without favoring any single party. Resource exploration, particularly for hydrocarbons, introduces economic stakes that complicate consensus, as joint development proposals must navigate sovereignty sensitivities. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has advocated for cooperative arrangements, yet claimant states seek clearer safeguards against unilateral drilling.

Military activities pose another hurdle, with debates over whether the COC should restrict certain exercises or overflights in contested areas. Dispute resolution mechanisms are equally divisive, as some parties favor binding arbitration while others prefer diplomatic consultations to preserve flexibility. The Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs has pushed for references to established international norms in these areas, highlighting how these sticking points could extend timelines beyond the ASEAN Secretary-General's target. Addressing them demands creative compromises that accommodate diverse legal interpretations while fostering confidence-building measures.

US-Philippines Alliance Dynamics and EDCA Bases

The US-Philippines alliance, reinforced through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, introduces additional complexity to the COC landscape by expanding access to Philippine bases for joint training and logistics. This development, managed via the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs, signals Manila's hedging strategy amid territorial tensions, potentially influencing ASEAN-China talks by raising concerns over external military footprints. China perceives these arrangements as complicating factors that could militarize the region, prompting Beijing to accelerate COC finalization as a counterbalance.

EDCA sites enhance interoperability between U.S. and Philippine forces, affecting negotiating dynamics by providing Manila with greater deterrence options. This shifts the strategic calculus for other claimants, who must weigh alliance benefits against the risk of alienating China, a major trading partner. Second-order effects ripple through ASEAN, where members like Indonesia and Singapore advocate neutrality to maintain economic ties with both powers. The alliance thus underscores the limits of ASEAN centrality when bilateral security pacts intersect with multilateral diplomacy.

Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Other Claimant States' Positions

Vietnam maintains a firm position on the Code of Conduct, emphasizing equitable resource sharing and opposition to any provisions that might legitimize expansive claims. Hanoi has coordinated with ASEAN partners to ensure the agreement incorporates mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement. Malaysia and Brunei, with their own overlapping claims, prioritize economic cooperation and environmental protections, often aligning with ASEAN's collective voice while pursuing bilateral energy deals. These states view the COC as essential for safeguarding navigation freedoms and fisheries that underpin their economies.

Other ASEAN members contribute through working-level consultations, stressing that the code must not undermine the 2002 Declaration's spirit. Their positions reflect a shared interest in preventing escalation that could disrupt supply chains vital to the Global South. Strategic implications include enhanced ASEAN cohesion if the year-end target is met, yet persistent divergences risk fragmenting the bloc's influence in great-power competition.

The Role of the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling Ten Years On

The 2016 PCA ruling continues to shape COC discussions a decade later, with the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs invoking its findings on maritime entitlements to bolster legal arguments. Although China has not accepted the award, it informs ASEAN positions on features and zones, influencing textual language around rights and obligations. The ruling's enduring relevance lies in its clarification of international law principles, which some parties seek to embed indirectly within the COC framework.

Ten years on, the decision highlights the gap between legal clarity and political implementation, as claimant states navigate enforcement challenges. This dynamic affects China's strategic interests by sustaining pressure for a code that sidesteps arbitration references. For regional stability, the ruling serves as a reference point that could either facilitate or hinder consensus, depending on how parties reconcile it with bilateral negotiations.

Strategic Implications for Regional Stability and Great Power Competition

A concluded Code of Conduct by year-end would bolster ASEAN centrality, providing a normative shield against great-power encroachment in the Indo-Pacific. It would advance China's objectives of technological self-sufficiency and regional influence while offering ASEAN members leverage in multilateral institution-building. Yet failure to meet the timeline risks heightened tensions, with U.S. alliances amplifying competition and affecting trade routes critical to the Global South.

Second-order effects include potential realignments among ASEAN states, where economic dependencies on China compete with security partnerships involving external actors. Overall, the COC represents a test of whether diplomacy can manage overlapping claims without undermining stability, with outcomes shaping the architecture of Asian security for years ahead.