POGOs and Online Scams, From the Philippines to Myanmar

In recent months, the transnational dynamics of human trafficking and online fraud in Southeast Asia have re‑emerged as a focal point for scholars of regional security and migration policy. The phenomenon, which now stretches from the Philippines through Thailand to Myanmar, can be traced to the rapid expansion of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs) in the mid‑2010s and the subsequent crackdown by Philippine authorities in the early 2020s. This article examines the historical roots of the current scam‑compound networks, the legal and institutional responses of the Philippines, and the broader implications for Korean diplomatic and development engagement in the region.

Historical emergence of POGOs and the genesis of scam compounds

The genesis of today’s organized‑crime hubs lies in the proliferation of POGOs beginning in 2016. According to journalist Eunice Barbara Novio, who has documented the trafficking routes of Filipino victims, POGOs first took hold in Bamban, a small agricultural town north of Manila. The rapid growth of these offshore gaming enterprises created a fertile environment for illicit recruitment, as operators offered false job promises to Filipinos seeking overseas work.

Novio’s testimony highlights that the POGO model, originally designed to serve foreign online gambling markets, quickly morphed into a conduit for forced online scams. Victims were lured with the prospect of legitimate employment, only to be confined in makeshift compounds where they were compelled to run fraudulent operations under threat of physical abuse. This pattern of deception and coercion established a template that later traffickers adapted for cross‑border operations in Myanmar.

Legal crackdown in the Philippines and the sentencing of a local official

In late 2024, the Philippine government instituted a blanket ban on POGOs, signaling a decisive shift in policy toward curbing the illicit economies they fostered. The ban was accompanied by a series of prosecutions targeting both the operators and local officials complicit in the trafficking networks. Notably, former Bamban mayor Alice Guo was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2025 after a Philippine court convicted her of qualified human trafficking. The court found that Guo had overseen the forced labor of hundreds of individuals within scam compounds, subjecting them to mistreatment and torture.

This high‑profile conviction underscores the Philippine Department of Migrant Workers’ (DMW) longstanding role in managing the nation’s extensive overseas labor force. The DMW’s institutional capacity, built over decades of handling expatriate workers, has been mobilized to extract and repatriate victims of organized crime, as Novio observes. The department’s involvement illustrates a rare convergence of migration governance and criminal justice in the region.

Continuing presence of Filipino victims in Myanmar

Despite the Philippine crackdown, Novio reports that the number of Filipinos still detained in Myanmar scam compounds remains in the thousands. While precise figures are unavailable, the qualitative assessment indicates that organized crime syndicates have relocated deeper inland, distancing their operations from the Thai border to evade detection. This strategic shift reflects an adaptive response to heightened law‑enforcement pressure in both the Philippines and Thailand.

The persistence of these victim populations poses a complex challenge for regional cooperation. Victims are often held in remote border areas, making rescue operations logistically difficult and politically sensitive. The continued exploitation of Filipino nationals also raises concerns about the adequacy of existing bilateral mechanisms for victim assistance and repatriation.

Implications for Korean diplomatic engagement

South Korea’s diplomatic posture toward Southeast Asia has increasingly emphasized collaborative approaches to transnational crime and labor migration. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has, in recent years, supported capacity‑building initiatives for law‑enforcement agencies in the Philippines and Thailand, recognizing the interconnected nature of trafficking networks. The emergence of Myanmar‑based scam compounds, however, introduces a new variable that may require recalibrated engagement.

Given Korea’s own experiences with overseas workers in the region, Korean diplomatic missions could leverage the expertise of the Department of Migrant Workers to develop joint protocols for victim identification and repatriation. Moreover, Korean think tanks such as the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) could produce comparative analyses of anti‑trafficking frameworks, informing policy adjustments within Korean foreign aid programs.

The role of academic and policy research in addressing the crisis

Academic scrutiny of the POGO‑originated trafficking model is essential for crafting effective interventions. Scholars at institutions like the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) have begun to map the flow of illicit labor across borders, highlighting the importance of data‑driven approaches. By integrating field reports from journalists such as Novio with quantitative migration statistics, researchers can delineate the scale and pathways of exploitation.

Furthermore, interdisciplinary research that combines criminology, migration studies, and regional security can illuminate the incentives that drive traffickers to relocate operations inland. Such insights are valuable for anticipating future shifts in trafficking patterns and for designing preemptive policy measures.

Policy recommendations for regional cooperation

Drawing on Novio’s observations and the broader context of Southeast Asian anti‑trafficking efforts, several policy recommendations emerge. First, the Philippines should continue to empower the Department of Migrant Workers to act as a liaison with foreign counterparts, facilitating the rapid extraction of victims from remote compounds. Second, Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs should coordinate with Myanmar authorities to establish joint patrols along the border, targeting the logistical corridors used by traffickers.

Third, a multilateral task force comprising MOFA, the Department of Migrant Workers, and international NGOs could develop a standardized victim‑assistance protocol, ensuring that rescued individuals receive medical, psychological, and legal support. Finally, sustained funding for research initiatives led by Korean and regional think tanks would enable continuous monitoring of trafficking trends and the evaluation of policy efficacy.

Looking ahead: the evolving landscape of transnational fraud

The transformation of POGO‑related scams into inland Myanmar compounds signals a broader evolution in the geography of online fraud. As traffickers adapt to law‑enforcement pressure, they are likely to seek more remote and less regulated environments, potentially expanding into other neighboring states. This trajectory underscores the necessity for anticipatory diplomacy and proactive policy design.

For Korea, the challenge lies in balancing its economic interests in the region with a commitment to human rights and regional stability. By drawing on the institutional experience of the Philippine Department of Migrant Workers, supporting rigorous academic research, and fostering multilateral cooperation, Korean policymakers can contribute to a coordinated regional response that mitigates the human cost of transnational scams while reinforcing the rule of law across Northeast Asia.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: The Diplomat; thediplomat.com; Global1.News (23 September 2026).

By Prof. David Park, Staff Writer