Young men live in fear of being snatched off the streets and sold to Myanmar's army

In the southern Karen capital of Hpa‑An, young men now dread leaving their homes after dark. The fear is not of stray violence but of plain‑clothed agents of Myanmar’s military regime who roam the streets, arresting men in their teens, twenties and thirties and forcing them into service. The phenomenon reflects a broader, systematic effort by the junta to meet its recruitment quotas amid a protracted war of attrition that has engulfed the country since the February 2021 coup.

Conscription law fuels a human supply chain

Three years after the coup, the military government introduced a mandatory conscription law that obliges all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve at least two years under military command. The law, described by former officer Maj Naung Yoe as “one of the most severe and impactful actions taken against the entire civilian population since the military coup,” carries a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment for those who refuse. This legal framework has been used to create a “human supply chain” that sustains the army’s ranks as it confronts ethnic militias, pro‑democracy groups and civilian‑led resistance movements.

According to leaked documents seen by BBC Burmese, authorities have been ordered to aggressively fulfil recruitment quotas across jurisdictions. The result is a dragnet that, over the past two‑and‑a‑half years, has already ensnared an estimated 100,000 young recruits. Many of these conscripts have been obtained through coercion, extortion and outright abduction rather than through any formal call‑up process.

Street‑level tactics in Hpa‑An

In Hpa‑An, the enforcement of the conscription law has taken on a particularly invasive character. Residents report that plain‑clothed operatives and local supporters of the regime patrol the streets, stopping youths and demanding they present identification. Those who cannot prove exemption are detained, often on the spot, and transferred to military recruitment centres. The same operatives also extract money by threatening detention, a practice highlighted by Maj Naung Yoe, who noted that “security forces track young people’s movements to arrest them, force them into service … extort money through threats of detention.”

The impact on daily life is stark. A 26‑year‑old tuk‑tuk driver, who asked that his name be omitted, explains that his family constantly reminds him not to take passengers too far and to stay vigilant. “People are panicked and frightened,” he says, adding that several acquaintances have already been taken. Parents now keep their children indoors after dusk, and many youths have fled the town altogether, seeking refuge in Thailand or with relatives elsewhere.

Administrative complicity and the sale of conscripts

The recruitment drive is not limited to street arrests; it also involves local administrative bodies. In Yangon, the case of Phyo Wai illustrates how ward officials have become intermediaries in the conscription process. After an argument with his wife, Phyo Wai disappeared and reappeared two days later at a military recruitment centre, having been transferred by his cousin—who works at the local ward administration office—to another ward that needed to meet its quota. The ward administrator later admitted to sending Phyo Wai to the military authorities, acknowledging that transfers between townships occur when local quotas cannot be met.

Ma Moe San Pan, Phyo Wai’s wife, alleges that her husband was effectively “sold” for a fee of four million kyats to fill the receiving ward’s quota. While the administrator denied any monetary transaction, the allegation underscores the blurred line between administrative duty and participation in a forced‑conscription market. The episode also reveals the limited recourse available to victims: police accepted her complaint about the sale and a separate scam that cost her 4.5 million kyats, but refused to register human‑trafficking charges, arguing that such a charge applies only when a person is sold abroad.

Statistical rise in disappearances

Open‑source research by Myanmar Witness, which analysed missing‑person advertisements on Facebook from 2021 to 2025, documents a sharp increase in reported disappearances following the introduction of the conscription law. Notices for January rose from four in 2021, before the coup, to 82 in 2025. The majority of those listed were men and boys, indicating that the conscription drive is a primary driver of the surge. The organization concluded that “much of the recruitment appears to be carried out through detention, coercion, and disappearance rather than formal call‑up, and often without notice to families.”

These figures, though limited to publicly posted notices, suggest a broader, hidden pattern of abductions that is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, the upward trend aligns with testimonies from Hpa‑An and Yangon, painting a consistent picture of a regime that increasingly relies on covert methods to meet its manpower needs.

Impact on the broader conflict

The influx of forced conscripts has had a tangible effect on the military’s operational capacity. Observers note that the additional reinforcements have helped the junta reclaim territory in several regions, putting many resistance forces on the defensive. However, the reliance on coercion has also fueled resentment and resistance. As more youths evade conscription—either by fleeing, joining armed groups, or simply refusing to cooperate—the army’s recruitment tactics have grown more extreme, creating a vicious cycle of repression and opposition.

Human‑rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights have condemned the practice as a form of forced labour and a violation of international law. Their reports emphasize that the abduction of civilians for military service constitutes a grave breach of the rights to liberty and security, and that the junta’s policies amount to a systematic campaign of terror against the civilian population.

Legal and humanitarian challenges

Efforts to hold the regime accountable face significant obstacles. Domestic legal avenues are constrained by the military’s control over the judiciary, and the police often refuse to pursue charges that could implicate the conscription system itself. In the case of Ma Moe San Pan, the police’s refusal to file human‑trafficking charges illustrates the limited scope of existing legal frameworks, which do not recognise internal forced conscription as trafficking.

Internationally, the situation raises complex questions about the applicability of humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect civilians from forced recruitment. While the United Nations and other bodies have condemned the junta’s actions, concrete measures to intervene remain hampered by geopolitical considerations and the junta’s isolation. Nonetheless, the growing documentation of abductions and the testimonies of victims provide a foundation for future advocacy and potential legal action in international forums.

Looking ahead: the human cost of a coerced army

The forced conscription policy has reshaped everyday life for countless families across Myanmar. Young men live under constant threat of being seized, while their relatives grapple with the loss of breadwinners and the trauma of seeing loved ones disappear into military barracks. The psychological toll—manifested in panic, fear and the erosion of trust in local authorities—undermines social cohesion and fuels further instability.

As the junta continues to press its recruitment quotas, the pattern observed in Hpa‑An and Yangon is likely to repeat in other towns and cities. Without a shift in policy or a decisive international response, the cycle of abduction, forced service and civilian suffering will persist, deepening the humanitarian crisis that has already plagued Myanmar for more than five years since the coup.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: BBC News Asia; bbc.co.uk; Global1.News (14 October 2026).

By Kenji Tanaka, Staff Writer