Türkiye's 'One Libya' Push: Fidan Bridges Tripoli and Benghazi

Türkiye’s ‘One Libya’ Push: Fidan Bridges Tripoli and Benghazi in High-Stakes Diplomatic Blitz

Ankara, Türkiye – August 13, 2026 — Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has concluded a rare and sweeping diplomatic tour of Libya, shuttling between the rival power centers of Tripoli and Benghazi in a concerted effort to cement Ankara’s role as a unifying broker in the North African state. The visit, which wrapped up Wednesday, saw Fidan engage with the full spectrum of Libya’s fractured political and military landscape, from the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the west to the Libyan National Army (LNA) command in the east.

In a statement following the talks, Fidan framed the mission as a concrete expression of Türkiye’s "One Libya" policy, a doctrine that explicitly rejects the east-west bifurcation that has paralyzed the country since the 2014 civil war. "Our visit has been a concrete manifestation of our 'One Libya' policy, which makes no distinction between Libya's west, east and south," Fidan said, thanking Libyan authorities for their hospitality. The diplomatic blitz underscores Ankara’s strategic recalibration: moving beyond its historical alignment with the GNU in Tripoli to actively court the eastern powerbrokers who control the country’s oil-rich crescent and much of its territory.

A Deliberate Two-City Strategy

Fidan’s itinerary was meticulously designed to signal even-handedness. In Tripoli, he met with GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Presidential Council President Mohammed al-Menfi, and High Council of State President Mohammed Takala. The discussions covered bilateral relations, Libya’s stalled political process, and regional security dynamics. Crucially, Fidan also convened a security conclave with the west’s top defense brass, including National Security Adviser Ibrahim Dbeibah, acting Defense Minister Abdulsalam al-Zoubi, Interior Minister Emad al-Trabelsi, Chief of General Staff Salah al-Din al-Namroush, and military intelligence chief Mahmoud Hamza.

The subsequent leg in Benghazi was arguably the more significant signal. There, Fidan met with LNA commander Khalifa Haftar, his deputy and son Saddam Haftar, House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh, and Belqasem Haftar, who heads the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund. This was not a mere courtesy call; it was a strategic engagement with the eastern establishment that Ankara once viewed with deep suspicion. By sitting down with the Haftar family and the Tobruk-based parliament, Fidan is signaling that Türkiye’s influence in Libya will no longer be contingent solely on its alliance with the GNU.

Ankara’s Strategic Calculus

The timing of this visit is no accident. Libya remains a theater of intense great-power competition, with Türkiye, Russia, the UAE, and Egypt all jockeying for influence over the country’s future trajectory. Ankara’s military intervention in 2020 was decisive in repelling Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, cementing Türkiye’s position as the kingmaker in the west. However, that victory came at a cost: it entrenched a zero-sum dynamic with the east, leaving Türkiye locked out of the territories and institutions controlled by the LNA.

Fidan’s visit suggests a pivot toward a more pragmatic, transactional approach. By engaging directly with Haftar and Saleh, Ankara is attempting to expand its footprint beyond the Tripoli bubble. The strategic prize is clear: access to Libya’s vast energy reserves, reconstruction contracts worth billions, and a say in the country’s eventual political settlement. "Türkiye does not consider Libya’s peace and stability separately from its own stability," Fidan said, stressing that Libyans should be able to determine and build their future in freedom, security, and prosperity.

This is not altruism; it is statecraft. A stable Libya aligned with Ankara would extend Türkiye’s maritime and economic influence deep into the central Mediterranean, challenging the dominance of European powers and rival Gulf states. The "One Libya" policy, therefore, is as much about Turkish national interest as it is about Libyan unity.

Security Cooperation as a Lever

A central pillar of Fidan’s message was the elevation of security and defense ties as a strategic component of the bilateral relationship. He described this cooperation as contributing directly to Libya’s stability and broader regional security. As part of his visit, Fidan met with Turkish troops serving with the Turkish Armed Forces’ Libya Task Group Command in Tripoli, a reminder of the substantial military footprint Ankara maintains in the country.

This security dimension is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides a stabilizing deterrent against renewed conflict. On the other, it complicates Türkiye’s efforts to present itself as an honest broker. The presence of Turkish forces, initially invited by the GNU to defend Tripoli, remains a contentious issue for the eastern camp. By meeting with the troops and reaffirming the strategic nature of the defense pact, Fidan is signaling that Ankara’s military presence is non-negotiable, even as it courts the east.

The inclusion of Belqasem Haftar in the Benghazi meetings is particularly telling. As head of the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, he controls a vast budget for infrastructure projects in the east. For Turkish construction firms and energy companies, this is the gateway to lucrative contracts. The meeting suggests that Ankara is exploring economic and reconstruction avenues as a means of deepening its ties with the east, moving beyond the security-centric relationship that has defined its engagement thus far.

The Regional Chessboard

Fidan’s visit must be viewed against the backdrop of shifting regional alignments. Türkiye’s recent diplomatic overtures toward Egypt and the Gulf states have created new space for maneuver in Libya. Cairo, which has historically backed Haftar, has been recalibrating its own stance amid a broader regional thaw. Similarly, the UAE’s influence in the east, while still significant, is being contested by Türkiye’s proactive engagement.

Russia’s presence in Libya, primarily through the Wagner Group’s successor entities, adds another layer of complexity. Moscow has cultivated ties with the LNA and has positioned itself as a spoiler capable of disrupting any settlement that excludes its interests. By engaging the east directly, Türkiye is effectively challenging Russia’s monopoly on influence in Benghazi, offering an alternative patron to the Haftar camp.

For the LNA, the calculus is equally pragmatic. While Haftar has long relied on Russian and Emirati support, the prospect of Turkish investment and reconstruction funding is a powerful lure. The eastern authorities control the oil fields but lack the technical expertise and capital to maximize their value. Türkiye, with its advanced energy sector and construction industry, offers a tangible economic lifeline that Moscow and Abu Dhabi have been slow to provide.

Honoring the Symbolism of Resistance

Beyond the high-stakes diplomacy, Fidan’s visit included a poignant symbolic gesture. He traveled to the Mausoleum of Omar al-Mukhtar in Benghazi, paying tribute to the revered Libyan resistance leader who fought against Italian colonial rule. "We visited the mausoleum of Omar al-Mukhtar, a leading figure in Libya's struggle for independence who resisted colonialism with dignity and determination," Fidan said, describing al-Mukhtar as "a revered hero across the Islamic world."

The choice of location was deliberate. By honoring al-Mukhtar, a figure revered across Libya’s east, Fidan is appealing to a shared Islamic and anti-colonial heritage that transcends the country’s internal divisions. It is a soft-power gesture aimed at the eastern population, signaling that Türkiye respects their history and identity, even as it navigates the complex politics of their leaders.

What Lies Ahead

The immediate outcome of Fidan’s visit is likely to be a series of confidence-building measures rather than a dramatic breakthrough. The GNU and the House of Representatives remain deeply divided over the legal framework for elections, and the security situation in the south remains volatile. However, the mere fact that a senior Turkish official can move freely between Tripoli and Benghazi, meeting with all major stakeholders, is itself a significant development.

Ankara’s "One Libya" policy, if sustained, could provide the diplomatic scaffolding for a renewed political process. By maintaining channels to both the GNU and the LNA, Türkiye positions itself as an indispensable mediator, capable of translating its military and economic leverage into political influence. The coming months will test whether this high-wire act can yield tangible progress, or whether the deep-seated rivalries that have defined Libya’s post-2011 trajectory will once again prove insurmountable.

For now, Fidan’s visit has reset the terms of engagement. Türkiye is no longer merely a guarantor of the west; it is a pan-Libyan player with a seat at every table. Whether that translates into stability remains an open question, but Ankara has made its intentions clear: it intends to be at the center of Libya’s future, whatever shape it takes.

By Malik Hassan, Staff Writer

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on sources cited in the article.