Did the killing of ‘El Mencho’ in February change the cartel he led? US report offers clues

When the Mexican army stormed a ranch in Jalisco on February 22, 2026, the world watched as Nemesio Rubén “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes, the founder of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), fell mortally wounded. The operation sparked a cascade of roadblocks, burned buses and storefronts across the country, a vivid reminder that the cartel’s reach can still choke a community like a tianguis in the middle of a storm. Yet, a year later, the United States’ Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) reports that the hoped‑for “decapitation” of the cartel did not fracture it into competing factions. Instead, the organization appears to have weathered the loss, showing signs of both resilience and subtle weakening.

What a “decapitation strike” really meant

The OSAC’s October 9 briefing frames the February raid as a classic decapitation strike: a government effort to cut off the head of a criminal enterprise in hopes that the body will collapse without its central nervous system. The council notes that the intent was to remove a leader who inspired loyalty among high‑ranking members and to force the franchise‑style cells of the CJNG to fragment without executive direction.

In practice, however, the cartel’s daily operations had already begun to function without El Mencho. OSAC argues that the founder had been under such intense pressure from the looming threat of arrest that the organization’s “brand” had outgrown personal loyalty. This shift away from a single charismatic figure meant that the immediate removal of the leader did not trigger the large‑scale fragmentation analysts had feared.

The leadership vacuum: stepson or network?

Sources cited by OSAC, including the U.S. Department of State, point to Juan Carlos Valencia González—El Mencho’s stepson—as the likely new head of the CJNG. The U.S. State Department even raised the reward for his capture to $25 million after the February raid. Yet the council also notes that the cartel may have chosen a different path: rather than naming a single successor, it appears to rely on a network of powerful regional leaders.

This decentralized model seems to have prevented a violent scramble for power. OSAC reports that there was no significant violent competition for the top spot, a development that may stem from the cartel’s gradual shift away from centralized authority under El Mencho. The continuity of regional leadership has kept most of the CJNG’s operations intact, allowing the organization to continue its illicit activities with relatively little internal bloodshed.

Continuing violence, but on a smaller scale

Although the CJNG has not launched a large‑scale territorial push since February, the cartel’s capacity to wage violence remains evident. Residents of Michoacán reported the resumption of drone attacks as early as March, just weeks after the raid. Moreover, the CJNG has re‑engaged in inter‑cartel clashes with the Mayiza faction of the Sinaloa cartel, suggesting that its resources are still robust enough to defend its turf.

These actions indicate that while the cartel’s overall strategic posture may have softened, its ability to conduct localized attacks and protect its interests endures. The absence of a grand offensive does not equate to a disappearance, but rather a recalibration of tactics in the wake of leadership loss.

Law‑enforcement pressure and structural weakening

OSAC highlights a series of successful law‑enforcement actions that have chipped away at the CJNG’s infrastructure. In August, Security Minister Omar García Harfuch announced the arrest of 32 CJNG members across Hidalgo, Jalisco and Michoacán. Among those captured was Audias “El Jardinero” Flores Silva, a former security chief for El Mencho.

Particularly effective have been operations targeting the cartel’s money‑laundering arm, the Cuinis. The arrest of Cuinis leadership has limited the group’s influence over financial flows, while coordinated Mexican and U.S. actions have frozen accounts and assets linked to CJNG members. These financial blows, combined with the removal of key operatives, suggest a gradual structural weakening that may limit the cartel’s capacity to expand or dominate new territories.

Homicide trends: a sign of progress?

The OSAC points to homicide data as a barometer of the cartel’s strength. Federal statistics released on September 8 show a 39.6 % decline in homicides in Jalisco and a 40.5 % decline in Michoacán for the first eight months of 2026, compared with the same period the previous year. Such drops could signal that law‑enforcement pressure is curbing the CJNG’s ability to impose its rule of terror.

Nevertheless, both states still rank among the 11 most violent in the nation for the January‑August period, and other CJNG‑active states—Guanajuato, México State and Guerrero—recorded even higher murder rates. The data thus paints a mixed picture: progress in certain strongholds, but persistent violence elsewhere, underscoring that the fight against the CJNG is far from over.

The human side: families and communities feel the shift

For families in the ejidos of Jalisco and the colonias of Michoacán, the decline in homicides offers a glimmer of relief. Mothers who once feared sending their children to school now hear fewer gunshots echoing from the streets. Yet the lingering presence of CJNG‑controlled drug routes and extortion racks means that many still live under the shadow of the cartel.

Local merchants recount the February roadblocks and arson attacks that halted commerce for days, a vivid memory of how quickly the cartel can disrupt daily life. While the recent arrests have removed some of the most visible enforcers, the network of regional leaders continues to extract “piso” from small businesses, keeping the cycle of fear alive. The community’s resilience, however, shines through in neighborhood watches and the growing cooperation with municipal authorities, a grassroots response that may prove decisive in the long run.

What the future may hold for CJNG and Mexico’s security

OSAC cautions that the true measure of the CJNG’s strength will become clearer as more reliable crime data emerges. A sustained decline in homicides, disappearances and illicit activity across CJNG‑dominated areas would confirm that the decapitation strike and subsequent law‑enforcement actions have indeed weakened the cartel.

Conversely, if violence rebounds or if new leaders emerge to fill the vacuum left by El Mencho and the arrested Cuinis figures, the organization could adapt and reassert its dominance. The cartel’s shift toward a decentralized network may make it harder to dismantle, requiring a continued, coordinated effort from Mexican and U.S. authorities, as well as from the communities that stand on the front lines of this conflict.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: Mexico News Daily; mexiconewsdaily.com; Global1.News (13 October 2026).

By Rosa Martinez, Staff Writer