Ringleader of multi-state cell tower theft gang sentenced to six and a half years in prison

When you hear about a gang stealing power rectifiers from cell towers, you might think it’s just another petty crime story. But the reality is far more unsettling for anyone who runs critical communications infrastructure. The recent sentencing of Stephan James Evanovich—identified as the ringleader of a multi‑state theft ring—exposes a glaring vulnerability that independent hosting providers, telecom operators, and even the emergency services we all rely on must confront. The case isn’t just about a few stolen parts; it’s about a coordinated effort that endangered 911 services across several states and revealed how easily a handful of rogue actors can infiltrate the very backbone of our digital society.

What the case actually involved

The FBI‑led investigation uncovered a conspiracy that spanned California, Illinois, Colorado and Texas. Evanovich, a 47‑year‑old from Placerville, orchestrated a network of thieves who broke into communications towers and lifted rectifiers—those little power‑conversion units that keep a tower humming when the grid falters. The gang didn’t just walk away with a handful of components; they stole, sold and shipped more than 700 rectifiers across state lines, using fake invoices and fictitious business names to mask the theft as legitimate commerce.

Four co‑conspirators—Trevor Fountain, Jonathan Matthew Curl and Andrea Carter, all hailing from Sacramento—were the boots on the ground. They physically entered the towers, stripped out the rectifiers and other equipment, and then passed the loot up the chain to Evanovich. He, in turn, paid them and funneled the stolen gear to unwitting third‑party vendors in the four states mentioned. The Justice Department’s statement made it clear that this wasn’t a harmless hobby; the theft “endangered cellular communications, including potentially disrupting 911 services.” That’s a serious claim, because a tower without power can’t relay emergency calls, and the ripple effect can cripple entire regions during a crisis.

Why the theft matters to hosting providers

From a founder’s seat, the first thing that jumps out is the sheer scale of the operation. Over 700 rectifiers is not a trivial cache—it represents a substantial chunk of the power redundancy that many carriers rely on to keep their towers alive when the grid goes down. For independent hosting firms that lease backhaul from these carriers, any loss of tower uptime translates directly into latency spikes, packet loss, and in worst‑case scenarios, complete service outages for customers.

What’s more, the theft was orchestrated to look like a legitimate supply chain transaction. That means the usual checks—purchase orders, invoices, vendor vetting—were deliberately subverted. If a small hosting outfit trusts a vendor without rigorous verification, it could end up with counterfeit or stolen gear, jeopardizing its own data center power infrastructure. The lesson is stark: supply‑chain integrity is a frontline defense, not a back‑office afterthought.

The risk to emergency communications

The Justice Department’s focus on 911 risk is not hyperbole. Cellular towers are often the only conduit for emergency calls in rural or underserved areas. When a tower loses power, the network falls back to neighboring cells, which can be overloaded or out of range. In a coordinated outage—whether caused by a natural disaster or a malicious act like this theft—the emergency call routing can fail, leaving citizens stranded without a lifeline.

For providers that host public safety applications—think dispatch dashboards, real‑time location services, or telemetry from first‑responder devices—the reliability of the underlying cellular network is a non‑negotiable SLA. Any breach in that reliability can expose providers to liability, regulatory scrutiny, and a loss of trust that is far harder to rebuild than any technical fix.

How the gang slipped through the cracks

The operation hinged on a simple but effective tactic: using fake business names on invoices to disguise stolen rectifiers as legitimate purchases. This subterfuge exploited a common weakness in many procurement processes—over‑reliance on paperwork without cross‑checking the underlying asset provenance. The thieves also leveraged interstate transportation, which added a layer of jurisdictional complexity that slowed detection.

From a practical standpoint, the case underscores the need for real‑time asset tracking. Many carriers still rely on manual logs for tower equipment, a practice that is ripe for exploitation. Embedding RFID tags or serial‑number verification into the supply chain could have flagged the anomalous movement of hundreds of rectifiers across state lines, triggering an early alarm before the theft ballooned into a multi‑state operation.

What the sentencing tells us

Evanovich received six years and five months in prison, while his co‑conspirators got shorter terms ranging from 20 to 29 months, coupled with restitution orders—$282,193 for Curl and $225,989 for Fountain. The disparity in sentencing reflects the hierarchy of the operation: the mastermind got the longest stretch, while the foot soldiers received lighter terms but still faced financial penalties.

From a risk‑management perspective, the restitution amounts are a reminder that even when a criminal is caught, the financial fallout can linger. Victims—whether they’re the original equipment owners, the third‑party vendors who bought the stolen gear, or downstream customers who suffered service interruptions—must absorb the cost of replacement, investigation, and potential legal exposure. For a small hosting firm, a single incident like this could wipe out months of profit.

Actionable steps for independent providers

First, tighten your procurement vetting. Require multiple forms of verification for any vendor supplying power equipment—serial numbers, manufacturer certificates, and a direct line of communication with the original supplier. Second, implement an asset‑tracking system that logs every piece of critical hardware from receipt through installation and de‑commissioning. A simple spreadsheet won’t cut it; you need a system that can generate alerts when equipment moves outside approved geographic zones.

Third, audit your tower and backhaul contracts for clauses that hold carriers accountable for equipment theft and service disruption. If a carrier can’t guarantee the integrity of its tower power supply, you should have the right to demand redundancy or alternative routing. Finally, run tabletop exercises that simulate a loss of tower power in a region—test how your services degrade and whether your emergency communication channels stay alive. Knowing the weak points before a real incident hits is the only way to stay ahead of thieves who think they can profit from a simple rectifier.

Bottom line for the industry

The Evanovich case is a wake‑up call that the “low‑tech” nature of a theft doesn’t make it any less dangerous. When a gang can steal hundreds of power rectifiers and masquerade the loot as legitimate inventory, the entire ecosystem—carrier, vendor, hosting provider, and end‑user—feels the tremor. The risk isn’t just about losing a few dollars; it’s about compromised emergency services, broken SLAs, and a tarnished reputation that can sink a business faster than any cyber‑attack.

In a world where hyperscalers flaunt cheap, “plug‑and‑play” pricing while cutting corners on supply‑chain security, independent operators must double down on diligence. The cost of a robust verification process is pennies compared to the fallout of a service outage that knocks 911 calls offline. Stay vigilant, lock down your hardware supply chain, and never assume a piece of equipment is safe just because it arrived with a pretty invoice.

— Allan Ali, Founder

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: Data Center Dynamics; datacenterdynamics.com; Global1.News (13 October 2026).

By Allan Ali, Global1.News