You know the launch market is tough when satellite companies start building rockets

AST SpaceMobile, the Texas‑based satellite operator that has been scrambling for launch slots, just announced a bold new venture: the development of its own medium‑lift launch vehicle, dubbed Blacklift. The company says Blacklift will be able to loft 20 metric tons to low‑Earth orbit and that commercial flights could begin in late 2028. That timeline, however, flies in the face of every historical precedent in the modern launch arena, and it raises a host of questions about why a firm already locked into launch contracts would pour billions into a rocket it may never need.

Why a Satellite Operator Is Turning to Rocket Building

AST SpaceMobile’s core business is building massive “BlueBird” satellites that can beam cellular signals directly to phones on the ground. The firm has already secured launch agreements with SpaceX, Blue Origin and others for more than 100 BlueBirds slated for deployment between 2027 and 2028. Yet, as the article notes, “satellite operators planning to deploy large constellations need to secure launch capacity years in advance.” When those slots are scarce or come with unfavorable pricing, the pressure to secure a dedicated launch pathway can become overwhelming.

That pressure is what’s driving AST to the extraordinary step of building its own rocket. The company’s own words describe Blacklift as “the springboard to significantly expand our total addressable market, providing AST SpaceMobile with regular unconstrained access to orbit.” In other words, the firm wants to sidestep the competitive launch market and guarantee a reliable, self‑controlled pathway for its satellites.

The Historical Context of Medium‑Lift Development

Developing a new medium‑lift rocket is no small feat. The article points out that the typical development cycle for comparable vehicles runs five to nine years from public announcement to first orbital launch. SpaceX’s Falcon 9, for instance, took 4.7 years from concept to flight, but it benefited from three years of prior operations, a proven Merlin engine line, and a team of engineers that the article describes as “insanely talented.” Even with those advantages, Falcon 9’s lift capacity was about 10 tons—half the payload promised by Blacklift.

Other U.S. players—United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan, Rocket Lab’s Neutron, Relativity Space’s Terran R, Firefly/Northrop Grumman’s Eclipse, and Stoke Space’s Nova—have announced vehicles ranging from roughly 7 to 27 tons. Of those, only Vulcan has actually reached orbit, and it took 8.7 years, supported by extensive federal backing. The pattern is clear: medium‑lift rockets demand years of engineering, testing, and regulatory clearance, even for firms with deep aerospace pedigrees.

AST’s Engine Deal: A Shortcut or a Band‑Aid?

AST is trying to shave time off its schedule by partnering with Firefly for engines. The company has signed an agreement to receive Firefly’s Miranda and vacuum‑variant Vira engines, with nine Miranda units slated for Blacklift’s first stage. The article notes that “engines are typically the hardest part of a rocket’s development,” and that securing them could save “a year or two, not five.” However, the Miranda engine is still at least two years away from flight testing on Firefly’s Eclipse vehicle, meaning the engine supply chain alone will not close the gap between a 2026 announcement and a 2028 launch.

Financially, the deal is massive. AST has committed $1.3 billion to Firefly—$800 million for the engine license, $250 million for 27 Miranda and nine Vira engines, and another $250 million for engineering support. Spread across the first three Blacklift rockets, that translates to roughly $83 million per vehicle just for propulsion. Those figures underscore how costly it is to buy a shortcut, and they raise the question of whether the investment will pay off if the rockets never become operational.

Comparing Blacklift to Its Peers

Blacklift’s advertised 20‑ton lift capacity places it squarely in the middle of the current U.S. medium‑lift market. It is larger than SpaceX’s original Falcon 9 design (about 10 tons) but smaller than Blue Origin’s New Glenn, which sits above the 30‑ton range. The article lists several contemporaries—Vulcan, Neutron, Terran R, Eclipse, Nova—each targeting payloads from 7 to 27 tons. Among those, only Vulcan has demonstrated orbit capability, and it required nearly nine years and substantial federal support.

AST’s timeline, therefore, is not just optimistic; it is “wildly, fantastically, and stupidly optimistic,” according to the source. The firm is attempting to compress a development cycle that historically spans half a decade into a two‑year window, even with an engine partnership that only trims a fraction of that time.

The Business Logic Behind Blacklift

At first glance, the economics appear dubious. AST already has launch contracts covering over 100 BlueBird satellites by the end of 2028. If those contracts are honored, why invest billions in a rocket that may not be needed? The article asks the same question: “Do you spend several billion dollars to develop a rocket you don’t actually need?”

One possible answer lies in market control. Owning a launch vehicle could allow AST to schedule launches on its own timetable, avoid price volatility, and potentially offer launch services to other satellite operators—turning a cost center into a revenue stream. Yet the article points out that the company’s own statement frames Blacklift as a means to “significantly expand our total addressable market,” implying that the rocket is envisioned as a platform for broader commercial use, not merely a private launch pipe.

What This Means for the Wider Launch Landscape

AST’s move reflects a broader trend: satellite operators, frustrated by a crowded launch market, are increasingly considering vertical integration. The article also mentions Cowboy Space, which announced a large rocket called Big Iron for orbital data centers, also targeting a 2028 first flight. The convergence of satellite firms and launch startups signals a deepening launch crisis, one that investors are willing to fund despite the high risk.

However, history is a stern teacher. The track record of medium‑lift development shows that even well‑funded, experienced teams need years to mature a vehicle. If AST cannot meet its 2028 target, it risks not only financial loss but also credibility damage that could jeopardize its existing launch contracts. The market will be watching closely—both for the technical progress of Blacklift and for any signs that the company’s “optimistic” timeline is more hype than reality.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: Ars Technica; arstechnica.com; Global1.News (08 November 2026).

By Jessica Ali, Staff Writer