Laos Expected to Scuttle ASEAN’s South China Sea Code of Conduct

As the Philippines assumes the 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, it faces an unexpected obstacle from within the bloc: Laos, whose deepening dependence on China threatens to derail the long‑awaited China‑ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea. The development, reported by diplomatic sources, underscores how Beijing’s strategy of leveraging smaller ASEAN members to undermine collective action continues to shape regional security dynamics.

Why the Code of Conduct matters to ASEAN

The CoC is intended to provide a rules‑based framework for managing the South China Sea disputes that affect almost a quarter of global trade. By negotiating with China as a united bloc, ASEAN could present a centrist political and trade voice capable of balancing Beijing’s expansive maritime claims. The Philippines, under Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro, has made the CoC the centerpiece of its chairmanship, seeking to move the protracted diplomatic saga—spanning more than two decades—toward a concrete outcome.

Beyond trade, the CoC is seen as a safeguard against unilateral actions that could destabilise the region’s sea lanes of communication. A unified ASEAN stance would limit China’s ability to pursue bilateral negotiations that sidestep international rulings, such as the 2016 arbitral award rejecting its expansive “nine‑dash line” claims.

China’s historic use of proxies to stall the CoC

China has long preferred bilateral talks that allow it to reject collective decisions and maintain its strategic footholds on artificial reefs. In 2012, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen signalled a shift toward Beijing, blocking explicit references to the Scarborough Shoal standoff and Chinese incursions in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Philippines and Vietnam. The outcome was a historic failure to produce a joint communique, a diplomatic embarrassment for Phnom Penh and a clear illustration of China’s proxy tactics.

Subsequent delays, compounded by the COVID‑19 pandemic, saw Cambodia repeatedly align with Beijing to scuttle progress on the CoC. The pattern demonstrates China’s willingness to rely on pliant ASEAN members to keep the multilateral process frozen while it expands its military and civilian presence along their coastlines.

Cambodia’s waning role and the search for new allies

While Cambodia’s Belt and Road investments have dwindled, the country remains under pressure from both Beijing and the United States. Sources note that Cambodia, overwhelmed by organised‑crime scams and border tensions with Thailand, is moving closer to Washington and is less able to absorb further diplomatic strain from blocking the CoC. This shift creates a vacuum that Beijing is eager to fill through other regional partners.

Myanmar, still barred from ASEAN summits due to the 2021 military coup, is a potential but currently unavailable ally. Timor‑Leste, the newest ASEAN member, is gravitating toward China yet remains cautious not to antagonise Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, or Cambodia—countries that could penalise it for supporting a CoC that challenges Beijing’s claims.

Laos emerges as China’s new linchpin

Laos, landlocked and described as an “economic basket case,” has become the most viable conduit for Beijing’s influence within ASEAN. Recent developments include the inauguration of a China‑Laos Military Joint Support and Training base north of Vientiane and the September “Peace Train 2026” joint exercises. These moves parallel China’s earlier development of the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, signalling a pattern of deepening military cooperation with compliant ASEAN members.

A Western source familiar with CoC negotiations warned that Cambodia “does not have the appetite” for further confrontation, highlighting Laos as the only ASEAN country Beijing can now lean on. The source asserted that Laos “will have to defend its interests” and is poised to “shatter the Philippine dream of using the chair to pass the Code of Conduct.”

Implications for the Philippines’ chairmanship

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s chairmanship, scheduled for the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila (November 16‑18), faces a precarious diplomatic landscape. The Philippines’ push for the CoC rests on rallying ASEAN consensus, yet Laos’ alignment with Beijing threatens to fracture that unity. If Laos blocks or dilutes the CoC language, the summit could end without a substantive agreement, undermining the Philippines’ diplomatic capital and its broader strategy to assert a rules‑based order in the South China Sea.

Moreover, the Philippines must balance its own security concerns—particularly the ongoing Scarborough Shoal standoff—with the need to maintain ASEAN cohesion. A failure to secure the CoC could embolden China to continue bilateral pressure on individual states, reinforcing the very dynamic the Philippines seeks to counter.

Regional reactions and the broader strategic picture

Other ASEAN members are watching the Laos‑China partnership closely. Vietnam, which has been directly affected by Chinese maritime encroachment, is likely to intensify its calls for a robust CoC. Indonesia and Malaysia, both with significant maritime interests, share the Philippines’ desire for a collective negotiating platform. Yet their ability to counterbalance Laos’ stance is limited without a unified front.

The United States, while not explicitly mentioned in the source, has historically supported ASEAN cohesion as a counterweight to China. Cambodia’s tilt toward Washington suggests a potential avenue for U.S. diplomatic engagement, but the immediate concern remains Laos, whose landlocked geography makes it uniquely dependent on Chinese economic aid and infrastructure projects.

Outlook: prospects for a CoC amid shifting alliances

Given the current trajectory, the likelihood of a decisive CoC outcome at the Manila summit appears uncertain. Laos’ recent military cooperation with China, combined with its economic reliance on Beijing, positions it as a critical veto player. Unless the Philippines can persuade Laos to adopt a more neutral stance—or secure alternative support from other ASEAN members—the CoC may remain stalled, perpetuating the status quo of bilateral negotiations that favour China.

In the longer term, the evolving dynamics underscore the fragility of ASEAN’s consensus‑building mechanisms when faced with external pressures. The bloc’s ability to present a united front on maritime security will hinge on its capacity to manage intra‑regional dependencies on China, particularly among its most vulnerable economies. The outcome of the 2026 summit will thus serve as a barometer for ASEAN’s resilience in the face of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: The Diplomat; thediplomat.com; Global1.News (30 October 2026).

By Kenji Tanaka, Staff Writer