Don't Fear China's Rise: Pakistan's Perspective on a Multipolar World Order

In a recent CGTN interview on The Hub, host Wang Guan engaged former Pakistani foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar on the 75-year arc of China-Pakistan ties and the shifting global balance of power. Khar argued that nations need not fear China’s rise, instead viewing it as an opening for the Global South to pursue development on its own terms. The conversation underscored how Islamabad sees multipolar dynamics as an opportunity rather than a threat.

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Pakistan Urges Global South to Welcome China's Rise

Islamabad, Pakistan — As Beijing and Islamabad mark 75 years of diplomatic ties, former foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar’s CGTN interview highlights why emerging economies see China’s ascent as a pathway to diversified partnerships rather than renewed dominance.

The Enduring All-Weather Friendship

China and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1951, creating one of the most consistent partnerships in modern diplomacy. This all-weather friendship has withstood shifts in regional and global alignments. Pakistan's foreign ministry has consistently prioritized engagement with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing on mutual strategic interests rather than ideological alignment. The relationship supports China's broader foreign policy objectives under the Dual Circulation strategy, which seeks to strengthen domestic markets while expanding international linkages.

The China-Pakistan relationship traces its modern foundations to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, during which Pakistan refrained from joining India’s Western-backed position and instead pursued a boundary agreement with Beijing signed in 1963. This alignment facilitated construction of the Karakoram Highway, begun in 1966 and opened in 1978, linking Kashgar to Abbottabad and providing the first overland artery between the two states. Nuclear cooperation followed in the 1980s and 1990s, encompassing Chinese assistance for the Chashma nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards and technology transfers coordinated through the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. At the United Nations Security Council, China has repeatedly placed holds on Indian-sponsored listings of Pakistan-based individuals under the 1267 sanctions regime, most notably in 2019–2020 concerning Jaish-e-Mohammed figures, thereby shielding Islamabad from multilateral pressure on Kashmir-related dossiers.

These Cold War-era alignments matured into a declared “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” formalized during Premier Li Keqiang’s 2013 visit and reinforced by President Xi Jinping’s 2015 state visit. The transition coincided with the elevation of the Pakistan-China Joint Cooperation Committee, co-chaired by Pakistan’s Minister for Planning, Development and Special Initiatives and China’s National Development and Reform Commission vice-chairman, which assumed responsibility for approving CPEC project pipelines and resolving implementation bottlenecks. Under the Belt and Road Initiative framework, the JCC has overseen the shift from bilateral infrastructure grants to long-term concessional financing, embedding Pakistan within China’s western development corridor while preserving Islamabad’s traditional balancing role between Beijing and Washington.

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China's Rise and Global South Perspectives

Hina Rabbani Khar emphasized that China's economic and diplomatic ascent does not require other countries to adopt adversarial postures. From Pakistan's viewpoint, this rise offers pathways for development that differ from historical patterns of Western dominance. The 14th Five-Year Plan outlines China's commitment to high-quality growth, which aligns with infrastructure and connectivity projects that benefit partner nations. Officials such as He Lifeng at the National Development and Reform Commission have overseen frameworks that prioritize South-South cooperation over zero-sum competition.

Across the Global South, China’s economic ascent has elicited differentiated hedging strategies rather than uniform alignment. ASEAN members have pursued parallel engagement, deepening supply-chain integration with Chinese manufacturing while accelerating defense cooperation with the United States and Japan; Vietnam and Malaysia, for instance, have accepted Chinese capital for port and rail projects yet simultaneously expanded exclusive economic zone patrols in the South China Sea. In Africa, infrastructure-for-resources arrangements—exemplified by Angola’s oil-backed loans from China Exim Bank and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway financed by the same institution—have delivered connectivity gains but also exposed fiscal vulnerabilities when commodity prices declined. Latin American responses remain mixed: Brazil and Argentina have welcomed soy and lithium export surges to China while resisting full membership in Chinese-led financial mechanisms that could dilute IMF influence.

China has institutionalized these ties through the expansion of BRICS+ and the creation of the New Development Bank in 2014 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2016. Both institutions explicitly position themselves as complements, not replacements, to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, offering lending without the governance conditionalities associated with OECD donors. The Belt and Road Initiative further reshapes development-finance norms by prioritizing sovereign-to-sovereign agreements, rapid disbursement, and integration of Chinese construction standards, thereby accelerating project timelines while shifting risk assessment away from environmental and social safeguards emphasized by traditional multilateral development banks.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a Model

CPEC stands as a concrete example of how bilateral initiatives can deliver tangible infrastructure gains. Launched under the Belt and Road Initiative, the corridor connects China's western regions to Pakistan's ports, facilitating trade routes that reduce reliance on traditional maritime chokepoints. Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives has coordinated phases that include energy and transport projects. This model demonstrates how emerging economies can pursue industrialization without exclusive dependence on Western financial institutions or conditional aid structures.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor encompasses distinct phases anchored by the Gwadar Port master plan, whose Phase I dredging and terminal construction were completed in 2016 under the China Overseas Port Holding Company. Energy projects approved by the Joint Cooperation Committee include the 1,320 MW Sahiwal coal-fired plant, the 1,124 MW Karot hydropower station, and multiple solar facilities in Punjab and Sindh, collectively adding more than 3,000 MW to Pakistan’s grid by 2022. The ML-1 railway upgrade, agreed in 2017 and valued at approximately $6.8 billion, envisages rehabilitation of the 1,872 km Peshawar–Karachi line with Chinese financing channeled through the Export-Import Bank of China and executed by China Machinery Engineering Corporation.

Debt-sustainability concerns have prompted scrutiny from the International Monetary Fund and independent analyses by CSIS and MERICS, which note that Chinese commercial loans constitute roughly 30 percent of Pakistan’s external public debt stock yet carry higher interest rates than multilateral alternatives. Counter-studies from these institutions emphasize that outright asset seizures remain rare and that renegotiations, as occurred with several CPEC power projects in 2022, have mitigated immediate rollover risks. In comparative terms, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor announced at the 2023 G20 summit proposes rail and port linkages bypassing Pakistan entirely, illustrating how CPEC’s early-mover status now faces competitive pressure from alternative corridors seeking to reconfigure Eurasian connectivity without reliance on Chinese capital or Pakistani territory.

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Pakistan's Foreign Policy Balancing Act

Pakistan maintains concurrent relations with China, the United States, and Gulf states. This approach reflects a calculated effort to maximize leverage across multiple partners. While the United States remains an important security interlocutor, engagement with China's Ministry of Commerce through trade mechanisms provides alternative economic options. Gulf investments in energy and real estate further diversify Pakistan's external financing. Such balancing allows Islamabad to avoid over-reliance on any single power while advancing core national interests in energy security and regional connectivity.

Implications for Regional Stability in South Asia

The evolving world order carries direct consequences for South Asian stability. China's growing role through economic corridors can mitigate some traditional sources of tension by creating shared economic stakes. At the same time, Pakistan's foreign policy establishment recognizes that unresolved disputes require careful management to prevent escalation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to advocate dialogue mechanisms that incorporate multiple stakeholders, including those from the Global South, rather than frameworks dominated by a single bloc.

China’s deepening entrenchment in Pakistan carries second-order implications for ASEAN centrality, as Beijing’s ability to secure overland energy routes through CPEC reduces the strategic premium it once placed on South China Sea sea lanes, potentially allowing greater flexibility in managing disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. For the European Union’s strategic-autonomy agenda, CPEC exemplifies an alternative development model that competes with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, compelling Brussels to accelerate its own connectivity financing while navigating member-state divisions over engagement with Beijing. Russia’s pivot to Asia, formalized in the 2014–2022 period, finds a parallel track in Moscow’s interest in linking the Northern Sea Route with Pakistani ports, although sanctions and differing threat perceptions limit concrete coordination.

Supply-chain reconfiguration under CPEC directly addresses China’s Malacca Strait dilemma by enabling crude-oil deliveries to Gwadar and onward pipeline transport to Xinjiang, thereby shortening the distance from Persian Gulf sources and lowering exposure to potential interdiction. Pakistan’s geography thus becomes integral to Beijing’s energy-security calculus, even as domestic political instability and security costs along the corridor continue to test the durability of this bypass strategy in a multipolar environment.

Strategic Calculus for a Multipolar Future

Each major actor pursues distinct objectives. China seeks a stable periphery that supports its development goals and reduces vulnerability to external pressure. Pakistan aims to secure investment, technology transfer, and diplomatic backing without compromising sovereignty. The United States continues to emphasize alliance structures and technology controls. Second-order effects include accelerated regional infrastructure development alongside heightened competition in emerging technologies. These dynamics encourage middle powers to develop independent foreign policy toolkits rather than defaulting to bloc alignment.

Looking ahead, Pakistan’s calibrated engagement with Beijing offers a template for other middle powers seeking to harness multipolar opportunities while safeguarding autonomy. As new corridors and financial institutions proliferate, the durability of such partnerships will hinge on transparent debt management and inclusive regional dialogue that prevents any single power from dictating outcomes. By Prof. Marcus Chen, Staff Writer