Tianjin Summit Signals the End of Western-Dominated Regional Order, Pakistani Official Says

In a recent CGTN report, Pakistani politician and journalist Mushahid Hussain Syed delivered a pointed assessment of the shifting global landscape ahead of the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, scheduled for August 31 to September 1, 2026, in Tianjin, China. Speaking with CGTN reporter Li Jingjing, Syed argued that the era when "a few Western capitals could determine the fate of other regions is over." He framed the SCO's expanding role as a direct reflection of a broader demand from regional countries for a stronger voice in shaping their own affairs, concluding that China and the Global South are on the "right side of history." The remarks come as Tianjin prepares to host what organizers describe as the largest gathering in the bloc's history, with leaders from over 20 countries and 10 international organizations expected to attend. The summit marks a quarter-century of institutional evolution for a grouping that has grown from a six-member confidence-building forum into a ten-member heavyweight bloc spanning Asia and Europe.

The SCO at 25: From Border Confidence to Strategic Heft

The SCO's trajectory since its founding in 2001 has been nothing short of transformative. What began as the "Shanghai Five" mechanism—initially focused on border demarcation and confidence-building measures between China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics—has evolved into a comprehensive multilateral platform. The 2024 Astana expansion brought Iran and Belarus into the fold, raising full membership to ten states: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus. This expansion is not merely numerical; it represents a geographic and geopolitical broadening that now encompasses nearly half of humanity.

The Tianjin summit's scale—over 20 countries and 10 international organizations—signals that the SCO has transcended its original security-focused mandate. The bloc now functions as a parallel architecture to Western-led institutions, offering an alternative venue for dialogue on security, economic connectivity, and political coordination. For Beijing, the SCO serves as a cornerstone of its multilateral institution-building strategy, complementing initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The grouping's growth reflects a deliberate Chinese effort to cultivate regional governance structures that operate outside the orbit of Washington-led alliances.

Significantly, India's Prime Minister is confirmed to attend the Tianjin summit, underscoring that even the bloc's most contentious bilateral relationship—the China-India border dispute—has not prevented New Delhi from engaging with the SCO framework. This attendance carries strategic weight: it demonstrates that the SCO has become an indispensable diplomatic fixture for all major Asian powers, regardless of their other alignments. The inclusion of both India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed rivals, within the same institutional framework is itself a testament to the SCO's unique convening power.

The Global South's Demand for Agency: A Structural Shift

Syed's assertion that regional countries want a stronger voice is not rhetorical flourish; it reflects a measurable shift in global diplomatic behavior. The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of regional groupings—from the BRICS expansion to the African Union's admission to the G20—all driven by the same underlying demand: that decisions affecting the Global South should not be made exclusively in Washington, Brussels, or London. The SCO's growing role is part of this broader phenomenon, offering a platform where regional powers can coordinate positions without Western mediation.

This demand for agency is rooted in concrete grievances. Many Global South nations have watched as Western-led institutions imposed conditionalities, sanctions, and policy prescriptions that often failed to account for local realities. The SCO, by contrast, operates on principles of non-interference and consensus-building, which resonate strongly with member states wary of external intervention. For countries like Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO offers a diplomatic space where their interests are treated as central rather than peripheral.

The strategic calculus for China is clear: by championing the Global South's demand for agency, Beijing positions itself as the standard-bearer for a more equitable international order. This narrative aligns with China's official foreign policy doctrine, which emphasizes "multipolarity" and the reform of global governance institutions. The SCO serves as a tangible demonstration that alternative institutional frameworks are not only viable but increasingly attractive to nations seeking to diversify their diplomatic dependencies.

China's Multilateral Institution-Building: Strategy and Substance

China's role in the SCO's evolution cannot be separated from its broader multilateral strategy. Beijing has consistently used the SCO as a vehicle to advance its vision of regional cooperation, emphasizing connectivity, counter-terrorism coordination, and economic integration. The Tianjin summit, hosted by President Xi Jinping, will likely showcase Chinese initiatives aimed at deepening economic ties among member states, potentially including new infrastructure financing mechanisms and trade facilitation agreements.

The SCO's institutional development mirrors China's approach to global governance reform: incremental, consensus-based, and focused on tangible outcomes rather than ideological confrontation. Unlike Western institutions that often attach political conditionalities to cooperation, the SCO emphasizes mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. This approach has proven attractive to a diverse range of states, from authoritarian Central Asian republics to democratic India, precisely because it accommodates different political systems without demanding convergence.

For Beijing, the SCO also serves a strategic purpose in counterbalancing Western influence in Central Asia and South Asia. The bloc provides a framework for coordinating with Russia on regional security matters while simultaneously expanding Chinese economic penetration into resource-rich Central Asian markets. The inclusion of Iran further extends the SCO's reach into the Middle East, creating a contiguous bloc of nations that share an interest in resisting Western sanctions and pressure campaigns.

Pakistan's Position: Between Strategic Depth and Economic Imperatives

Mushahid Hussain Syed's comments carry particular weight given Pakistan's unique position within the SCO. As a founding member alongside China, Russia, and the Central Asian states, Pakistan has consistently viewed the SCO as a crucial platform for enhancing its regional standing and deepening its strategic partnership with Beijing. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project, has transformed Pakistan into a critical node in China's trans-regional connectivity architecture, and the SCO provides an institutional framework that complements this bilateral relationship.

For Islamabad, the SCO offers multiple strategic dividends. It provides a venue for engaging with Central Asian markets, potentially unlocking new trade routes that could help diversify Pakistan's economy beyond its traditional reliance on the United States and Gulf states. The bloc also offers a diplomatic counterweight to Indian influence in the region, allowing Pakistan to engage with New Delhi within a multilateral framework that includes China as a balancing presence.

Syed's characterization of China and the Global South being on the "right side of history" reflects a broader Pakistani elite consensus that aligns with Beijing's vision of a multipolar world order. This alignment is not merely ideological; it is rooted in practical calculations. Pakistan's economic challenges, including chronic balance-of-payments pressures and energy shortages, make Chinese investment and cooperation essential to its development trajectory. The SCO, as a platform for economic cooperation, reinforces this dependency while simultaneously offering Pakistan a voice in shaping regional economic governance.

Implications for the United States and the Western-Led Order

The SCO's consolidation carries profound implications for the United States and the broader Western-led international order. Washington has historically viewed the SCO with suspicion, interpreting it as a vehicle for Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine Western influence in Eurasia. The bloc's expansion to include Iran—a country under comprehensive US sanctions—represents a direct challenge to Washington's ability to isolate adversaries through economic pressure.

The Tianjin summit's scale—with leaders from over 20 countries and 10 international organizations—sends a clear signal that the SCO has become a central venue for Eurasian diplomacy, one that operates entirely outside US influence. This development complicates American efforts to maintain its traditional role as the guarantor of regional security in Asia. The SCO's emphasis on non-interference and respect for sovereignty stands in implicit contrast to US-led interventions and democracy-promotion efforts, offering an alternative model of international cooperation that many Global South nations find more palatable.

For the United States, the strategic challenge is not merely the SCO's existence but its growing attractiveness to nations that Washington has historically taken for granted. The demand for agency that Syed articulates is a global phenomenon, and the SCO's success in channeling that demand into a functioning institution demonstrates that alternatives to Western-led multilateralism are not only possible but increasingly preferred. Washington's response—whether to engage with the SCO or continue treating it as a hostile bloc—will shape the future trajectory of Eurasian geopolitics.

What to Watch at Tianjin: Signals and Outcomes

As the Tianjin summit approaches, several indicators will merit close attention. First, the degree of substantive economic cooperation announced—whether new infrastructure projects, trade agreements, or financing mechanisms emerge—will signal whether the SCO is transitioning from a political forum to an economic powerhouse. Second, the tone of China-India interactions on the summit's sidelines will provide insight into whether the bloc's two largest members can manage their bilateral tensions within the multilateral framework.

Third, the summit's treatment of regional security issues—particularly Afghanistan, where SCO members share significant interests—will test the bloc's ability to coordinate on complex geopolitical challenges. Fourth, the extent to which the summit addresses the Global South's demand for governance reform will indicate whether the SCO is prepared to move beyond rhetoric to institutional innovation.

The 25th-anniversary summit represents more than a ceremonial milestone; it is an opportunity for the SCO to define its next quarter-century. For China, the summit offers a platform to consolidate its leadership role in shaping Eurasian governance. For the Global South, it provides a venue to articulate demands for a more equitable international order. And for the United States, it serves as a reminder that the unipolar moment has decisively passed. As Syed's comments suggest, the direction of history appears increasingly aligned with those who seek to build new institutions rather than defend old hierarchies.

By Prof. Marcus Chen, Staff Writer

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Sources: CGTN; Economic Times; New Indian Express.