Muslim States Warned Against Serving as Launchpads for Attacks on Iran

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a stark warning to the Islamic world on Thursday, declaring that no Muslim nation should permit its territory to be used as a staging ground for aggression against another Muslim country. Speaking at the opening of the 40th International Islamic Unity Conference in Tehran, Pezeshkian’s remarks come at a critical juncture, six months into a costly and bloody conflict with the United States and Israel that has left Iran’s economy in freefall and the region teetering on the edge of a wider conflagration.

"Defending Iran does not mean hostility toward Muslim nations or neighboring countries," Pezeshkian said in an address broadcast on Iranian state television. "No Islamic country should allow its territory to be used as a launchpad for aggression against another Islamic country. No Islamic country should seek its own security through the insecurity of its neighbors." The comments were directed at an audience of roughly 600 domestic and international guests from 40 countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Türkiye, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.

A Call for Unity Amidst a Six-Month War

The conference, themed "Islamic Unity in the Thought of the Martyred Imam," runs through August 30 across Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, with specialized sessions in West Azerbaijan, Kordestan, Golestan, and Razavi Khorasan provinces. Pezeshkian’s framing of unity was notably pragmatic, suggesting that Islamic solidarity does not require Muslims to abandon their religious, political, or national differences, but rather to ensure those differences do not transform into enmity.

The timing is deliberate. The war, which began on February 28, 2026, has evolved from a missile and airstrike campaign into a grinding economic siege. Pezeshkian referenced the conflict directly, noting that large-scale U.S. and Israeli military attacks began while diplomatic efforts between Tehran and Washington were still underway. He stated that Iran-U.S. negotiations had resumed that same month in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution when the attacks commenced, killing Iranian commanders, officials, scientists, and civilians, as well as targeting cities and infrastructure.

This narrative—that Tehran sought peace and was met with war—is central to Iran’s diplomatic strategy. By framing the conflict as an unprovoked aggression against the broader Islamic community, Pezeshkian is attempting to rally regional support and discourage Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, from offering logistical or territorial support to U.S. and Israeli operations.

The Economic Siege: Sanctions, Blockades, and Desperation

While Pezeshkian speaks of unity, the reality on the ground is one of severe economic distress. Six months into the conflict, the war has settled into a costly stalemate. The U.S. has shifted its battlefield focus from kinetic strikes to Iran's oil revenues, banks, and trading partners. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has vowed to cut off the financial lifelines sustaining Iran's economy, while a U.S.-led naval blockade restricts Tehran's oil exports and access to hard currency.

The numbers are stark. Annual inflation reached 66% in July, with consumer prices 87.9% higher than a year earlier, according to Iran’s Statistical Center. Food prices have surged 128% year-on-year. Pezeshkian himself acknowledged the severity of the squeeze last week, stating, "Our problems have multiplied several times over, while our income has also fallen."

Yet, the effectiveness of this strategy is deeply questioned. Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. diplomat and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, dismissed the administration's approach. "The administration is groping in a sort of desperate fashion to try to find a pathway out of this," Miller said. He noted that Bessent invoked the 1944 D-Day landings when unveiling the sanctions, but Miller countered, "To me, this isn’t D-Day. It’s Desperation Day. I don’t think the administration is any closer to finding a way out of this."

Tehran’s Bet: China, India, and the Limits of Sanctions

Washington’s threat to impose crippling new sanctions faces a fundamental structural problem: Tehran is betting that the U.S. will not take the final step of aggressively enforcing secondary sanctions on the countries keeping its economy afloat, foremost among them China and India. One senior Iranian official told Reuters that countries such as China would not stop cooperating with Iran simply to serve U.S. interests.

This is not a new calculation. Iran has spent decades adapting to sanctions and endured previous "maximum pressure" campaigns without altering its behavior. Michael Knights, head of research at Horizon Engage, a New York-based strategic advisory, noted that the naval blockade may prove more consequential than the sanctions themselves. Iran's immediate challenge, he argued, is no longer how to survive economic pressure but how to break out of it.

Knights suggested that mounting economic pressure may increase Iran's incentive to raise the cost of the confrontation for its adversaries by pressuring Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to push Washington toward a diplomatic off-ramp. He pointed to the model used by Iran's Houthi allies in the Red Sea: periodic attacks, intermittent negotiations, and a prolonged campaign of disruption short of all-out war. This could potentially target shipping, ports, energy infrastructure, or other critical assets to make the conflict increasingly costly for Gulf states to tolerate.

The Internal Threat: Repression and the Specter of Unrest

For Iran’s rulers, the biggest threat may not be economic pain itself, but the risk that worsening hardship again spills into mass unrest. Economic grievances have repeatedly erupted into nationwide protests in recent years. In January, demonstrations over economic hardship were crushed by the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia, with thousands reportedly killed.

The appointment this month of Hossein Taeb, a key architect of previous crackdowns, to lead the Basij is one of the clearest signs yet of official concern about renewed unrest, according to a former reformist official. The Basij, a paramilitary force affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, has been repeatedly deployed by Iran's clerical rulers to suppress protests.

This points to a paradox at the heart of Washington's strategy: sanctions may deepen Iran's economic damage without forcing its rulers to change course. The leadership has historically answered domestic unrest with repression and external pressure with threats of retaliation abroad. They prefer economic and diplomatic pressure to another round of war, but they fear an outcome that enables Iran to declare victory while retaining the ability to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global oil supply route that Tehran has effectively blocked, pushing up global oil prices.

Gulf Calculus: Fear of Victory and the Danger of Impasse

The Gulf states find themselves in an unenviable position. Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Center, said Gulf governments are unconvinced that sanctions alone can rapidly alter Iran's behavior, given the leadership's resilience and ability to maintain internal control. Significant political change, or the collapse of Iran's theocratic leadership, he said, is unlikely to come quickly.

The strategic calculus for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is complex. They want the conflict contained without letting Iran emerge as the victor, but they also fear that squeezing Tehran further could put them at greater risk. The senior Iranian official who spoke to Reuters emphasized this point, saying that Gulf Arab governments understood that increasing pressure on Iran could backfire on them.

The result is a dangerous impasse. Washington wants Iran to abandon its leverage over Hormuz without conceding Tehran a role in managing the waterway. Iran wants the U.S. naval blockade lifted without appearing to surrender. And the Gulf states want the conflict contained without letting Iran emerge as the victor. This triangular standoff, if mediated talks fail to produce a breakthrough, points toward a prolonged period of strategic attrition.

Regional Dynamics and the Great Power Chessboard

Pezeshkian’s speech at the Islamic Unity Conference is a direct appeal to this regional audience. By invoking the language of Islamic solidarity, he is seeking to delegitimize any Gulf cooperation with Washington and to position Iran as the defender of Muslim lands against foreign aggression. This narrative resonates in parts of the region, particularly among populations sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and wary of U.S. military presence.

However, the appeal is complicated by Iran's own actions. The crushing of domestic protests and the support for proxy militias across the region undermine Tehran's claims to moral leadership. Furthermore, the great power dynamics are shifting. While the U.S. remains the dominant external actor, China and Russia have deepened their economic and military ties with Iran, providing a partial buffer against Western sanctions.

Alan Eyre, a former U.S. diplomat who worked on Iran, questioned whether Washington has the international support and bureaucratic machinery to make the sanctions stick. Unlike the multilateral campaign preceding the 2015 nuclear deal, which curbed Iran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions, the latest measures rely on public threats rather than sustained diplomacy with allies and trading partners. From North Korea to Russia and Iran itself, sanctions have rarely forced governments to abandon goals they view as existential for their survival.

As the conference continues through Sunday, the world watches to see if Pezeshkian’s call for unity can translate into tangible regional support. For now, the war grinds on, the sanctions bite, and the risk of a wider conflagration—whether through a miscalculation in the Strait of Hormuz or a new wave of internal unrest—remains dangerously high. The Islamic world, as Pezeshkian rightly noted, must choose whether its differences will lead to enmity or to a common front against external intervention. The answer to that question will shape the Middle East for years to come.

By Malik Hassan, Staff Writer

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Sources: Daily Sabah, IRNA, Tasnim News Agency.