India seeks to counter Beijing influence in Southeast Asia ahead of ASEAN summit

In a region where Sunni-Shia competition, great‑power rivalry and energy security intertwine, the prospect of India emerging as a strategic alternative to China carries significant weight. Al Arabiya English’s recent video report, aired on 13 November 2026, examined this dynamic through the lens of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming participation in the ASEAN summit and India’s deepening military and economic ties with Southeast Asian states. The discussion, led by Professor Derek Grossman of International Relations, highlighted the sale of BrahMos anti‑ship cruise missiles to the Philippines and the potential for a new Quad leaders’ summit involving India, the United States, Japan and Australia. This article unpacks those points, situating them within the broader strategic contest between New Delhi and Beijing, and assesses the implications for regional stability, energy markets and emerging alliances.

Strategic backdrop: China’s entrenched presence in Southeast Asia

The South China Sea remains a flashpoint where China’s expansive maritime claims clash with the interests of several ASEAN members, most notably the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. Beijing’s construction of artificial islands, deployment of naval assets and insistence on a “nine‑dash line” have entrenched its influence and raised concerns over freedom of navigation, a cornerstone of regional trade and energy flows.

Within this contested environment, the United States and its partners have sought to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness through diplomatic engagement and security cooperation. The Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia and India, has increasingly positioned itself as a framework for a “free and open Indo‑Pacific,” yet the extent of India’s involvement has historically been limited compared with its other strategic partners.

Against this backdrop, Modi’s planned attendance at the ASEAN summit signals an intention to shift the balance. By engaging directly with Southeast Asian leaders, India aims to present itself as a reliable partner capable of offering alternative security and economic options, thereby challenging Beijing’s dominance without resorting to direct confrontation.

India’s military outreach: The BrahMos deal with the Philippines

One concrete illustration of India’s expanding security footprint is the sale of BrahMos anti‑ship cruise missiles to the Philippines, as highlighted in the Al Arabiya English report. The BrahMos, a supersonic missile system co‑developed by India and Russia, is renowned for its speed, precision and versatility against maritime targets. By supplying this capability to Manila, India not only deepens its defence ties with a key ASEAN member but also provides the Philippines with a credible deterrent against Chinese naval activities in the contested waters.

Professor Grossman noted that the missile sale arrives amid heightened tensions in the South China Sea, underscoring India’s willingness to translate its defence industrial capacity into diplomatic leverage. The transaction reflects a broader pattern of India leveraging its defence exports to forge strategic partnerships, a practice that aligns with its “Act East” policy and complements its growing economic engagement with the region.

While the report did not disclose the exact number of missiles or financial terms, the qualitative significance is clear: the BrahMos deal signals a deepening of India‑Philippines security cooperation, offering Manila a non‑Chinese source of advanced weaponry and reinforcing India’s role as a security guarantor in Southeast Asia.

Economic dimensions: India’s growing commercial ties

Beyond arms sales, India’s economic outreach to Southeast Asia has accelerated in recent years. Trade, investment and infrastructure projects have become pillars of New Delhi’s engagement strategy, aimed at creating interdependence that can offset Chinese economic clout. Although the video did not enumerate specific trade figures, it emphasized the “growing military and economic ties” between India and ASEAN members, suggesting a multi‑layered approach to partnership.

This economic dimension is crucial for several reasons. First, it offers Southeast Asian economies diversification of supply chains and markets, reducing reliance on China for critical inputs and technology. Second, Indian investment in sectors such as energy, information technology and manufacturing can stimulate growth in a region that is already a major consumer of energy and a hub for global trade routes.

By coupling economic incentives with security cooperation, India crafts a comprehensive partnership package that resonates with ASEAN’s principle of “unity in diversity” and its desire for balanced relations with all major powers.

Political signaling: Modi’s ASEAN participation

Modi’s scheduled presence at the ASEAN summit is more than a diplomatic courtesy; it is a strategic signal. The Al Arabiya English report framed his attendance as an opportunity to “pave the way for a new Quad leaders’ summit,” indicating that New Delhi seeks to elevate its role within the broader Indo‑Pacific architecture.

During the summit, Modi is expected to engage with heads of state and government, discussing both bilateral issues and collective concerns such as maritime security, counter‑terrorism and economic cooperation. By positioning himself as a proactive partner, Modi can reinforce India’s image as a reliable stakeholder willing to share the burden of regional stability, a narrative that contrasts with China’s more unilateral approach.

The prospect of a Quad summit that includes India alongside the United States, Japan and Australia would institutionalise Delhi’s involvement in a security framework that directly counters Beijing’s influence. While the report did not confirm concrete plans for such a summit, the discussion of its potential underscores the strategic calculus behind Modi’s ASEAN outreach.

Regional implications: Stability, energy markets and alliance patterns

If India successfully consolidates its defence and economic ties with Southeast Asian nations, the regional balance could shift in several ways. First, enhanced Indian security assistance, exemplified by the BrahMos sale, may deter aggressive actions by China, contributing to a more stable security environment in the South China Sea. Stability, in turn, safeguards the free flow of maritime trade, which underpins global energy markets and the economic vitality of the Indo‑Pacific.

Second, deeper Indian engagement could stimulate competition among external powers for influence in ASEAN, prompting China to adjust its diplomatic overtures and potentially moderate its assertiveness to retain goodwill. This competitive dynamic may encourage ASEAN members to leverage the rivalry to extract greater concessions, thereby reinforcing the bloc’s strategic autonomy.

Third, the emergence of a more robust Quad, with India as a full participant, could formalise a security architecture that aligns with the United States’ “free and open Indo‑Pacific” vision. Such an alliance would likely coordinate naval patrols, intelligence sharing and joint exercises, further integrating India into the regional security fabric and offering a counterweight to China’s maritime militia and coast guard activities.

Outlook: Challenges and opportunities for India’s regional ambition

While the opportunities are evident, India faces notable challenges in translating its strategic intent into tangible outcomes. The BrahMos deal, though symbolically significant, represents a single element of a broader security partnership that must be deepened through regular joint exercises, capacity‑building programmes and sustained diplomatic engagement.

Moreover, India’s own domestic priorities—economic reforms, infrastructure development and political considerations—could constrain the resources it allocates to external outreach. Balancing these internal demands with an assertive foreign policy will be critical to maintaining credibility with ASEAN partners.

Finally, the success of any prospective Quad summit hinges on the willingness of the United States, Japan and Australia to accommodate India’s strategic perspectives and to coordinate actions that avoid escalation with China. The Al Arabiya English report suggests that Modi’s ASEAN participation could be a catalyst for such coordination, but the path forward will require careful diplomatic choreography.

In sum, the video report underscores a pivotal moment in Indo‑Pacific geopolitics. India’s strategic overtures—embodied in the BrahMos sale, economic outreach and high‑level diplomatic engagement—signal a concerted effort to offer Southeast Asia an alternative to Beijing’s dominance. The regional implications span security stability, energy market continuity and the evolving architecture of alliances. How effectively New Delhi navigates these complexities will shape the balance of power in the Indo‑Pacific for years to come.

By Malik Hassan, Staff Writer

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: Al Arabiya English video report (13 November 2026); Al Arabiya English; Global1.News