Hindutva Goons Unleash Violence on Anti-Modi Protesters

Recent weeks have seen New Delhi and several other Indian cities become the stage for large‑scale anti‑government demonstrations, driven by accusations that the Chief Election Commissioner, Gyanesh Kumar, manipulated voter rolls to favour the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The protests, organized by groups such as the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), the All India Students’ Association and other left‑leaning organisations, have been met with an unprecedented level of state‑sanctioned intimidation and violence.

Escalating State Force Against Youth Activists

The BJP government has responded to the protests by deploying a combination of police and paramilitary forces that are normally reserved for border security or insurgency‑ridden regions. Units from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) were transferred from former Maoist strongholds in Chhattisgarh and from parts of the militancy‑hit Jammu and Kashmir to operate in Delhi. Alongside the Delhi Police, the Border Security Force, Indo‑Tibetan Border Police, and Sashastra Seema Bal have been positioned along protest routes, barricading roads, shutting down metro stations and conducting mass arrests.

These deployments signal a shift in the government’s security posture: forces that traditionally confront armed insurgents are now being used to suppress unarmed youth activists. The presence of such heavily armed units in the capital underscores the seriousness with which the administration views the dissent, and it raises concerns about the proportionality of the response.

Vigilante Groups Acting With Impunity

Beyond the official security apparatus, the protests have been infiltrated by civilian vigilante outfits that openly support the ruling party’s Hindutva agenda. Video footage circulating on social media shows men wearing saffron scarves—symbolic of the Sangh Parivar—chanting slogans such as “Delhi Police tum lath bajao, hum tumhare saath hain” (Delhi Police, wield the baton, we are with you) while beating protesters with sticks. These individuals are identified as members of the Hindu Raksha Dal (HRD), a group founded in 2013 that operates as a foot‑soldier arm of the broader Hindutva network.

The HRD activists have been documented assaulting young men, women and even minors in central Delhi on October 10. In one incident, a woman who attempted to intervene on a male victim’s behalf was dragged to the ground and had her clothing pulled, all while a police officer stood nearby. The officer eventually escorted the assailant away, but did not intervene to stop the assault. Such episodes illustrate a pattern where vigilantes act with the tacit approval of law‑enforcement agencies, effectively blurring the line between state violence and private mob action.

Government’s Reluctance to Hold Perpetrators Accountable

Public outrage over the October 10 video forced the police to detain four HRD members—Raman Saini, Vivekanand alias Vivek, Kapil Kumar and Ravinder Singh alias Govind Hindu. However, the arrests appear to have been driven more by media pressure than by a genuine commitment to justice. The detainees were released on bail shortly after, and the Delhi Police raised no objections to their release. Upon their release, HRD chief Bhupendra Singh Tomar, known as “Pinky Bhaiyya,” greeted them with garlands, reinforcing the perception that the state protects its ideological allies.

Tomar himself is a figure with a long record of legal trouble, including more than thirty cases for hate speech, weapon distribution, death threats, assault and extortion. Despite repeated arrests, he has repeatedly secured bail and returned to public life, embodying the slogan used by his supporters: “Aaj jail, kal bail, aur phir wahi khel” (jail today, bail tomorrow, and then the same game). This pattern of swift release suggests an institutional reluctance to prosecute Hindutva‑aligned actors, undermining the rule of law.

Historical Pattern of HRD Violence

The HRD’s violent activities predate the recent protests. In 2020, Tomar claimed responsibility for the attack on Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), describing the campus as a “hotbed of anti‑national activities” and taking “full responsibility” for the assault that injured at least thirty people, including teachers and students. In August 2024, HRD members set fire to houses and property in a Muslim‑populated slum in Ghaziabad, alleging that the residents were illegal Bangladeshi migrants. More recently, in December 2025, Tomar and his son were arrested for distributing swords in Ghaziabad under the pretext of providing “self‑defence” for Hindus.

These incidents demonstrate a consistent trajectory: the HRD mobilises under the banner of protecting “Sanatan Dharma” while targeting minorities, secular activists and critics of the BJP. The group’s actions are not isolated street crimes; they are part of a broader strategy to intimidate dissent and enforce a homogenised Hindu identity, often with the tacit blessing of state authorities.

Impact on Democratic Space and Civil Society

The combined use of paramilitary forces and sanctioned vigilante groups has a chilling effect on democratic participation. Young activists, already vulnerable to arrests and police intimidation, now face the added threat of being assaulted by non‑uniformed men who operate with police acquiescence. Reports of women being dragged and assaulted while trying to protect fellow protesters highlight the gendered dimension of this repression.

Such an environment discourages public assembly, a cornerstone of democratic expression. When the state not only tolerates but indirectly encourages extra‑legal violence, civil society organisations find it increasingly difficult to mobilise, raise grievances or hold the government to account. The erosion of safe protest spaces threatens the robustness of India’s democratic institutions.

International and Domestic Repercussions

Domestic outrage has been evident on social media, where the October 10 video sparked widespread condemnation. However, the government’s response—detaining a handful of low‑level HRD members while allowing senior leaders like Tomar to continue operating—has done little to assuage concerns. International observers, accustomed to monitoring India’s democratic health, may view the episode as indicative of a broader trend toward authoritarianism under the Modi administration.

Within India, opposition parties and human‑rights groups are likely to leverage these incidents to demand stricter enforcement of the law against vigilante groups. Yet, the entrenched patronage networks between the Sangh Parivar and state institutions pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. The persistence of such violence could fuel further polarization, potentially destabilising the already volatile political climate.

Prospects for Accountability and Reform

Addressing the nexus between state forces and Hindutva vigilantes will require both legal and political interventions. Legal avenues include pressing for the prosecution of HRD leaders under existing statutes that criminalise hate‑driven violence and the illegal distribution of weapons. Politically, opposition legislators may seek parliamentary inquiries into the deployment of border‑security forces for internal crowd control, arguing that such measures exceed the mandate of these agencies.

Nevertheless, the entrenched nature of the Sangh Parivar’s influence over the BJP suggests that any reform effort will face stiff resistance. The pattern observed—mass deployment of paramilitary units, police inaction during vigilante assaults, and rapid bail for accused Hindutva operatives—indicates a systemic tolerance for extra‑legal violence. For India’s democratic fabric to remain intact, sustained civil‑society pressure and vigilant international scrutiny will be essential in compelling the government to uphold the rule of law and protect the right to peaceful protest.

This article was produced with AI-assisted research and editorial support. Reporting is based on the source material cited below. Sources: The Diplomat; thediplomat.com; Global1.News (20 October 2026).

By Kenji Tanaka, Staff Writer